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ABSTRACT
Using On-Chip Error Detection to Estimate FPGA
Design Sensitivity to Configuration Upsets
Andrew Mark Keller
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, BYU
Master of Science
SRAM-based FPGAs provide valuable computation resources and reconfigurability; however, ionizing radiation can cause designs operating on these devices to fail. The sensitivity of an
FPGA design to configuration upsets, or its SEU sensitivity, is an indication of a design’s failure
rate. SEU mitigation techniques can reduce the SEU sensitivity of FPGA designs in harsh radiation environments. The reliability benefits of these techniques must be determined before they
can be used in mission-critical applications and can be determined by comparing the SEU sensitivity of an FPGA design with and without these techniques applied to it. Many approaches can be
taken to evaluate the SEU sensitivity of an FPGA design. This work describes a low-cost easierto-implement approach for evaluating the SEU sensitivity of an FPGA design. This approach uses
additional logic resources on the same FPGA as the design under test to determine when the design has failed, or deviated from its specified behavior. Three SEU mitigation techniques were
evaluated using this approach: triple modular redundancy (TMR), configuration scrubbing, and
user-memory scrubbing. Significant reduction in SEU sensitivity is demonstrated through fault
injection and radiation testing. Two LEON3 processors operating in lockstep are compared against
each other using on-chip error detection logic on the same FPGA. The design SEU sensitivity is
reduced by 27× when TMR and configuration scrubbing are applied, and by approximately 50×
when TMR, configuration scrubbing, and user-memory scrubbing are applied together. Using this
approach, an SEU sensitivity comparison is made of designs implemented on both an Altera Stratix
V FPGA and a Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA. Several instances of a finite state machine are compared
against each other and a set of golden output vectors, all on the same FPGA. Instances of an AES
cryptography core are chained together and the output of two chains are compared using on-chip
error detection. Fault injection and neutron radiation testing reveal several similarities between the
two FPGA architectures. SEU mitigation techniques reduce the SEU sensitivity of the two designs
between 4× and 728×. Protecting on-chip functional error detection logic with TMR and duplication with compare (DWC) is compared. Fault injection results suggest that it is more favorable
to protect on-chip functional error detection logic with DWC than it is to protect it with TMR for
error detection.

Keywords: FPGA, SEU mitigation, SEU sensitivity, reliability, error detection, triple modular
redundancy, TMR, duplication with compare, DWC, scrubbing, fault-tolerance, neutron radiation
testing, fault-injection
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CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

SRAM-based field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) are being used increasingly in terrestrial [1] and space-based applications [2]. Modern FPGAs provide large amounts of programmable
logic, computation resources, I/O, memory and special-purpose functionality. As FPGAs are released on new technology, they are able to provide this functionality at lower power and operating
frequencies. FPGAs are also increasingly integrating dedicated, hardened IP to provide a mix of
fixed function and programmable function solutions. Their reconfigurability and low overhead for
design development make them an attractive alternative to application-specific integrated circuits
(ASIC).
Because SRAM-based FPGAs use a large set of static configuration memory cells (CRAM)
to support programmability, designs operating on SRAM-based FPGAs are susceptible to failure
induced by ionizing radiation. The value stored in an SRAM memory cell can be inverted by
the passing of a single energetic atomic particle through the device. This is known as a single
event upset (SEU) [3–5]. SEUs are troublesome for SRAM-based FPGA designs because an upset
in configuration memory could alter the behavior of logic, routing, or other utilized resources.
These alterations could cause the design to fail, or deviate from its defined behavior. Ionizing
radiation is a great concern for FPGA applications in harsh radiation environments like space and
high-energy physics experiments, and it is a growing concern for FPGA applications in terrestrial
environments [6, 7].
The susceptibility of an FPGA design to failure caused by SEUs in configuration memory
is discussed throughout this thesis in terms of SEU sensitivity. SEU sensitivity is defined as how
prone to failure a given design is when a random SEU occurs. It is not guaranteed that an SEU will
cause a design operating on an SRAM-based to fail [8]. An SEU may occur in an unused portion
of the FPGA or be masked in such a way that it does not affect the correct behavior of the design.
Or it may alter the design and lead to failure [23, 24]. The likelihood of a random SEU causing a

1

design to fail determines SEU sensitivity. The more likely a random SEU is to cause failure, the
more sensitive the design.
Much research has been done to develop SEU mitigation techniques for SRAM-based FPGAs [9–12], which reduce SEU sensitivity. These techniques include structural redundancy such
as: triple modular redundancy (TMR), duplication with compare (DWC), and state machine encoding. While expensive from a resource perspective, these techniques can greatly improve the
reliability of a design [13]. Configuration scrubbing is also employed to rapidly repair upsets and
prevent the accumulation of upsets in configuration memory [14].
An improvement in reliability or a reduction in SEU sensitivity of an FPGA design is
referred to throughout this thesis as a ratio between the SEU sensitivity of the design without
SEU mitigation and with SEU mitigation techniques applied. An improvement in reliability and
a reduction in sensitivity are synonymous. For example, a 4× improvement in reliability or a 4×
reduction in SEU sensitivity means that there is a 4:1 SEU sensitivity ratio between the unmitigated
and mitigated version of an FPGA design respectively.
The SEU sensitivity of an FPGA design plays an important part in advancing the state of
the art in FPGA reliability. Knowing the SEU sensitivity of a particular design can help identify
what causes FPGA designs to be sensitive to SEUs. The impact of changes in the fabrication
process, architecture, and applied SEU mitigation techniques can all be better understood through
comparing the SEU sensitivity of various designs. SEU mitigation techniques can be validated and
additional vulnerabilities discovered through the SEU sensitivity of an FPGA design.
The SEU sensitivity of an FPGA design is typically evaluated through fault injection and
radiation testing. Fault injection is the process of artificially introducing a fault and observing the
response. The type of fault injection referred to in this work involves mimicking the behavior of
an SEU in an FPGA [15]. Radiation testing is the process of exposing the FPGA design to an
accelerated radiation source and observing the response. Several types of radiation used for SEU
sensitivity testing include: proton, neutron, and heavy ions [16]. SEU sensitivity is measured in
this work by the percentage of injected faults that caused a failure for fault injection and by the
design cross section for radiation testing.
Many test setups can be used to evaluate the SEU sensitivity of an FPGA design through
fault injection or radiation testing. SEU sensitivity testing is event based, where the event is the
2

occurrence of a functional failure. Most SEU sensitivity testing approaches depend on the ability
to detect when a functional failure has occurred. Typically, input stimulus is provided to the design
under test and its outputs are compared against a known golden value to detect failures. Most SEU
sensitivity testing approaches separate error detection logic from the device being tested. These
off-chip error detection approaches sometimes involve creating custom test boards that use multiple
FPGAs.
An on-chip error detection approach provides a cost effective means for rapidly evaluating
the SEU sensitivity of an FPGA design. Implementing off-chip error detection can be expensive
and time consuming. This thesis presents an on-chip error detection evaluation approach that is
low-cost and easier to implement. This approach uses additional logic resources on the same FPGA
as the design under test to determine when the design has failed, or deviated from its specified behavior. Although the error detection circuitry is also vulnerable to failure, valuable information
about the SEU sensitivity of a design can still be obtained using this approach. To improve accuracy, SEU mitigation techniques are always applied to the on-chip error detection circuitry. This
thesis describes the benefits and limitations of this approach as compared to those of other SEU
sensitivity evaluation approaches.
Using an on-chip error detection approach, the reliability benefits of three SEU mitigation techniques are evaluated: TMR, configuration scrubbing, and user-memory scrubbing. Two
LEON3 processors operating in lockstep are compared against each other using on-chip error detection logic on the same FPGA. The design SEU sensitivity is reduced by 27× when TMR and
configuration scrubbing are applied; and by approximately 50× reduction when TMR, configuration scrubbing, and user-memory scrubbing are applied together. Using this approach, an SEU
sensitivity comparison is made of designs implemented on both an Altera Stratix V FPGA and
a Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA. Several instances of a finite state machine are compared against each
other and a set of golden output vectors, all on the same FPGA. Instances of an AES cryptography
core are chained together and the output of two chains are compared using on-chip error detection.
Fault injection and neutron radiation testing reveal several similarities between the two FPGA architectures. SEU mitigation techniques reduce the SEU sensitivity of the two designs between 4×
and 728×. Protecting on-chip functional error detection logic with TMR and DWC is compared.
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Fault injection results suggest that it is more favorable to protect on-chip functional error detection
logic with DWC than it is to protect it with TMR for error detection.

1.1

Thesis Contributions
This thesis presents an approach for evaluating the SEU sensitivity of a design using on-

chip error detection. The advantages and disadvantages of many evaluation approaches are discussed, including those of on-chip error detection and other evaluation approaches used in related
works. A generalized composition of an on-chip error detection test fixture is presented and important aspects of on-chip error detection are covered. The importance of evaluating SEU sensitivity
and a comparison of various evaluation approaches is discussed in Chapter 3. On-chip error detection concepts and test fixture composition is covered in Chapter 4.
The work presented in this thesis uses on-chip error detection to evaluate the SEU sensitivity of several FPGA designs through fault injection and radiation testing. Unmitigated and mitigated FPGA designs were evaluated on a Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA and an Altera Stratix V FPGA.
Three SEU mitigation techniques were included in this study: TMR, configuration scrubbing, and
user memory scrubbing. Various integrations of theses techniques were evaluated, by only applying TMR to mitigate a design, or applying TMR with user-memory scrubbing and no configuration
scrubbing, etc. A LEON3 soft processor, a finite state machine, and a 128-bit AES cryptography
core were used as benchmark designs. A variety of on-chip error detection schemes and mechanisms were used to evaluate SEU sensitivity.
From the results, three main comparisons are made. First, the reliability benefits of various
mitigation schemes are compared, demonstrating the complementary nature of SEU mitigation
techniques. Second, the SEU sensitivity of FPGA designs across two different architectures are
compared, that of an Altera Stratix V FPGA and that of a Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA. Finally, SEU
sensitivity results obtained from fault injection are used to compare TMR protected and DWC
protected on-chip error detection logic.
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CHAPTER 2.

FPGA CONFIGURATION UPSETS AND MITIGATION TECHNIQUES

SRAM-based FPGAs, like application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), are susceptible
to radiation induced failures; fortunately, many mitigation techniques have been developed to improve the reliability of these devices in spite of their vulnerabilities [2]. Most radiation induced
failures in these devices result from non-permanent, soft errors that can be prevented, masked, or
recovered from. Radiation effects observed in an FPGA may or may not cause the design operating on the FPGA to cease functioning correctly. In developing SEU mitigation techniques and
preparing designs for use on commercial FPGAs in harsh radiation environments, it is important
to understand where radiation comes from, how it effects FPGA designs, and what can done to
improve the robustness of a design.
This chapter motivates the need for evaluating the effects of configuration upsets on FPGA
designs. Configuration upsets are caused by ionizing radiation, which is present in space and
terrestrial environments. Ionizing radiation can come from galactic cosmic rays or impurities in
packing materials. This radiation can cause FPGA designs to fail, or deviate from their specified
behavior. These failures are difficult to reproduce and are becoming a greater issue as features
sizes shrink and more FPGAs are being deployed in data centers and Internet core routers [1,
17]. SEU mitigation techniques can be applied to FPGA designs to make them less sensitive
to configuration upsets. This chapter discusses radiation sources, FPGA architecture, and SEU
mitigation techniques. It provides the background information necessary to fully appreciate the
purpose and challenges behind SEU sensitivity evaluation, and motivates the need for using the
proposed on-chip error detection approach to evaluate the SEU sensitivity of an FPGA design.
In this thesis, on-chip error detection is used to evaluate the SEU sensitivity of various
FPGA designs. Fault injection and radiation beam testing are used to simulate and cause SEUs in
FPGA configuration memory. Specific bits that cause the design to fail are observed and the overall sensitivity of the design to configuration upsets is determined. Unmitigated and SEU mitigated
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FPGA designs are evaluated on an Altera Stratix V and a Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA. The SEU mitigation techniques evaluated are: TMR, configuration scrubbing, and user-memory scrubbing. The
collected SEU sensitivity data assists in understanding the effects of radiation on FPGA designs
and the benefits of SEU mitigation techniques.

2.1

Radiation Sources
FPGAs are exposed to radiation present in their operating environments. FPGAs are de-

ployed in a number of applications including terrestrial and space based applications. In terrestrial
environments, there are three main sources of fault-inducing radiation: alpha particles, high-energy
cosmic rays and thermal neutrons [18]. These radiation sources pose a threat to FPGA reliability
in terrestrial [6, 7] and space environments. Other sources of radiation in space environments include: trapped protons, galactic cosmic rays (GCRs), and heavy ions [19]. The primary concern is
making sure that FPGA designs are able to withstand the type and amount of radiation present in
their operating environments.
A significant source of ionizing radiation are alpha particles emitted from impurities in
device materials. Alpha particles directly ionize the device as they pass through it. The dominant
sources of alpha particles are uranium and thorium found in the packing materials, which makes
shielding difficult. Special considerations can be taken to lessen the influence of alpha particles
emitted from packaging materials on FPGA devices [18].
Another significant source of fault-inducing radiation comes from cosmic rays. Cosmic
rays are high energy atomic particles that mostly originate from beyond the solar system. Less
than 1% of particles directly from cosmic rays ever make it to the earth’s surface. Due to their
density and stability, neutrons are the most likely candidate from cosmic rays to cause an upset
in an FPGA here on earth. Since neutrons are not charged, they indirectly ionize a device by
colliding with other atoms in the device, releasing secondaries [18]. The high energy neutrons flux
(above 10MeV) in New York City is approximately 13 n cm−2 h−1 and increases as a function of
altitude [4].
The third significant source of fault-inducing radiation comes from the interaction of thermal neutrons with boron-10 found in borophosphosilicate glass (BPSG), which has been used to
fabricate some FPGAs. Thermal neutrons are relatively slow and have energies of less than .4 eV.
6

After boron-10 absorbs a thermal neutron, it breaks apart into an alpha particle, a gamma ray, and
a lithium nucleus. The alpha particle ionizes the device and may cause a configuration upset. To
eliminate the threat posed by low-energy thermal neutrons, FPGAs can be manufactured without
the use of BPSG [7].
Radiation poses a greater concern in harsh radiation environments like space and highenergy physics experiments [6]. Mission length, environmental radiation, and the number of deployed units are all factors to take into consideration when determining the reliability needs of a
design [16]. The presence of radiation is a concern for FPGA designs because ionizing radiation
can affect the functionality and state of a design.

2.2

Radiation Effects
Radiation effects on SRAM-based FPGAs can be caused by a single energetic particle or

result from the accumulation of charge injected by radiation [19]. When a single energetic particle
creates an observable effect within the FPGA, it is known as a single event effect (SEE) [3]. Long
term effects of radiation exposure include total ionizing dose (TID). There are other radiation
effects such as displacement damage and prompt dose. This overview of radiation effects gives
attention to SEEs and focuses on SEUs, which alter FPGA configuration memory. This work does
not address TID or other radiation effects beyond SEEs. An explanation of various SEEs is given
and their influence on FPGAs is described.
Radiation effects result primarily from the funneling phenomenon. As shown in Figure 2.1,
when an ionized particle passes through a sensitive node in a semiconductor, a path of electron-hole
pairs is produced from the semiconductor material atoms, resulting in funnel-shaped equipotential
surfaces that create a current in the device [19, 20]. This can also occur when secondary particles from a neutron collision pass through the sensitive region of the device. This phenomenon
contributes to radiation effects and is the primary mechanism behind SEEs. Because of the complexities of this process, simplified fault models have been created to represent the behavior of
these effects at a higher level of abstraction.
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Figure 2.1: Funneling phenomenon in a N-type MOSFET. Adapted from a figure in [19].

2.2.1

Single Event Effects
SEEs are any observable effects caused by single energetic particle [3, 4]. There are two

main types of SEEs: destructive and non-destructive. Destructive SEEs can permanently damage
the FPGA, whereas non-destructive SEEs are transient and can be removed by reconfiguring or
power cycling the device. Destructive SEEs include: single event latchup (SEL), single event
burnout (SEB), and single event gate rupture (SEGR). Non-destructive SEEs include: single event
transient (SET), single event upsets (SEUs), and single event functional interrupts (SEFI). Of these
SEEs, SETs and SEUs are the primary concern for FPGA vulnerability because they occur more
frequently [16, 19, 20].
SELs occur when a particle strike causes an internal short between power and ground within
the FPGA. Only power cycling the FPGA can stop the SELs. If the SELs is not removed in time,
the FPGA can be permanently damaged because of the high-currents induced by the latchup [19].
A thoughtful FPGA fabrication process and layout can mitigate this effect [21]. FPGAs can be
tested for SEL immunity before being used in harsh radiation environments. Devices that are not
immune to SELs are often avoided for use in harsh radiation environments like space [16].
SETs occur when a particle strikes the channel region of an inactive n-type MOSFET or the
drain region of an inactive p-type MOSFET [19, 20]. The induced current pulse appears as a glitch
8
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Figure 2.2: An SEU within an SRAM-cell

and is short lived. SETs are assigned a polarity based on the transition of the output of the CMOS
device. Positive SET pulses transition from 0 to 1 and back to 0; negative SET pulses transition
from 1 to 0 and back to 1. SETs can be latched by memory elements as they propagate through the
device, which becomes a greater issue at faster clock speeds.
SEUs occur when ionizing radiation inverts the value stored in a memory element, such
as a configuration bit of an FPGA. An illustrative example, depicted in Figure 2.2, shows how a
single particle is able to upset the value stored in an SRAM cell. In this example an SET occurs
within a transistor of the feedback loop used to maintain the value of the SRAM-cell. With enough
amplitude, this SET disrupts the feedback loop of the cell and causes it to take on the inverted value.
When this occurs in an SRAM-based FPGA it can have many adverse effects (see Section 2.3).
SEFIs occur when elements of the FPGA that control its functionality as a whole are affected by a single particle strike. SEFIs can cause the entire FPGA to malfunction [19]. SEFIs are
temporary but could prevent reprogramming the FPGA until the next power cycle. There is some
state within an FPGA that, if upset, could disrupt the global functionality of the FPGA. While SEFIs are a concern to FPGA reliability, more SRAM-based FPGA design failures are due to SEUs
and SETs.

2.3

FPGA Architecture and SEU Failure Modes
Understanding FPGA architecture and design flow helps explain how SEUs, induced by

ionizing radiation, can adversely affect an FPGA design. This section describes basic FPGA architecture and how SRAM-based FPGAs support programmability. An overview is given for an
FPGA design flow from hardware description to configuration, and then common SEU failure
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Figure 2.3: Island-style FPGA Architecture Layout. Adapted from a Figure in [16].

modes are discussed. This background information motivates the need for SEU sensitivity evaluation of FPGA designs by explaining how an SEU can cause a design to fail.
An FPGA consists of basic logic building blocks and specialized hard IP blocks organized into a specific architecture. Lookup-tables and flip-flops are grouped into slices or cells
with other supporting hardware (e.g., carry-chains, multiplexers, control signals). Some lookuptables are read only, while others can have their values changed by the design (e.g. LUTRAMs,
shift-registers). Additional hard IP blocks can include: large user-memories (BRAMs), arithmetic units (DSPs), analog-to-digital converters (ADCs), high-speed serial I/O (MGTs), and clockmanagers (DCM). The available resources and architecture are vendor specific, but many popular
FPGA architectures are island-style meaning that groups of logic resources are surrounded by programmable routing interconnects in a 2D matrix like formation [22]. This layout is depicted in
Figure 2.3.
There are two major types of bits within an FPGA’s programming data: configuration
(CRAM) bits and internal block memory (BRAM) bits. Data associated with programmable interconnects, lookup tables, control signals, and the contents of smaller user-memories (e.g., flip-flops,
LUTRAMs, shift-registers) are stored in CRAM bits. Data associated with the contents of larger
blocks of user-memory are stored in BRAM bits. Although the percentage is small, there are other
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types of bits within the FPGA’s programming data (e.g., global status registers, test control logic).
The contents of user-memories may be altered by the design during operation. The configuration
of specific designs are loaded into the FPGA’s programming data.
Figure 2.4 shows the generalized FPGA design flow. Digital designs are described in a
hardware description language (HDL) and synthesized into a netlist, which describe the cell instances and connections needed to implement a given user-design. Computer aided design tools
(CAD) map the cell instances to technology specific primitives (e.g. a six input look-up-table).
These primitives are then placed, or assigned to a specific location in the FPGA. All of the connections are then routed using programmable interconnects. This information is used to generate
a bitstream, which is the contents of the CRAM bits and the initial value of the BRAM bits used to
program the FPGA. When the bitstream is configured onto the FPGA, all of its information, (the
lookup-table contents, interconnects, initial state, and other configuration), is loaded into the respective memory cells. SRAM-based FPGAs use SRAM-cells to store this information. Once the
FPGA is loaded, the design begins to operate on the FPGA fabric. Some memory cells maintain
their value throughout the operation of the design, others are user-memory resources and change
their values according to the design.

HDL

Logic
Synthesis

Netlist

Technology
Mapping

Placement
& Routing

Bitstream

Program
FPGA

Figure 2.4: Basic FPGA Design Flow

Since FPGA programming data stores circuit configuration and state, SEUs in an FPGA’s
programming data can alter the design operating on the FPGA and lead to failure. The main cause
of SEU failure modes in FPGAs are SEUs in routing resources, lookup tables, control signals,
and user-memories. SEUs in lookup tables and control signals can corrupt logic and alter the
functionality of primitive blocks used by the design. SEUs in user-memories can corrupt the state
of a design (see Figure 2.5). SEUs in routing resources may cause nets to disconnect, short to
power or ground, or bridge with other nets in the design (see Figure 2.6) [23, 24].
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Figure 2.5: SEU failure modes. SEUs can alter correct logic (a), control (b), or state (c).

To support all of the resources and possible interconnect configurations many CRAM cells
are needed to store the programming data. The specific role of each bit in the data is proprietary, but
a large portion of configuration memory is dedicated to functionality beyond user flip-flops, BRAM
content and LUT contents [25]. One study found through fault injection that approximately 80%
of FPGA design failures originate from SEUs in routing structures [23].

1 0 0
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0 0 1
0 0 1
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Figure 2.6: SEU routing failure modes. SEUs can alter correct routing (a) by shorting to ground
(b), disconnecting a route (c), or bridging two routes together (d).

2.4

Reliability: Faults, Errors and Failures
A reliable FPGA design is one that can withstand environmental factors, such as radiation,

without ceasing to provide its defined service. Unreliability stems from faults, errors and failures.
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A fault is the lowest level problem that occurs within the FPGA, such as an SEU. An error is the
manifestation of a fault, and a failure occurs when the provided service deviates from the intended
service [26]. It is important to understand that in any FPGA design, a fault may lead to failure but
the occurrence of a fault does not guarantee that an FPGA design will fail. A fault-tolerant FPGA
design can withstand more faults without failing.
Techniques can be applied to an FPGA design that will reduce its sensitivity to SEUs. These
SEU mitigation techniques typically mask or detect faults within the system through redundancy,
checkpoints, or some type of error correction code. By correctly masking or handling fault within
the design, the design becomes more fault-tolerant, meaning that it can tolerate more faults without
failing.
Radiation can cause faults within SRAM-based FPGAs. Any SEU in configuration memory
is a fault. Not all faults will affect an active design on an FPGA; a fault may or may not manifest as
an error. If an SEU occurs in an unused portion of the FPGA or in such a way that its effect on the
design is masked, it will not alter the operating design. For example, if an SEU causes the contents
of a LUT to change at a lookup address that is unused or otherwise masked, it will have no effect
on the operating design. This is significant because FPGA designs only utilize a portion of the
FPGA. As covered in Section 2.3, a fault can change the behavior and state of an FPGA design in
many different ways such as: changing the logic in a LUT, altering routing within the circuit, and
modifying the behavior of components. If an SEU does alter a configuration bit associated with
the proper operation of a design, it may cause an error in the design such as: providing incorrect
output, halting its operation, or otherwise deviating from its specified behavior.
An error is a deviation from expected behavior. Some errors can be detected and recovered
from or simply ignored. It is possible for an error to occur without being considered a failure. An
example of this is when the checksum of a communication interface does not check out but after
re-transmission, the correct data is received. Here the defined service is still provided even though
an error has occurred. Unacceptable errors are considered failures.
A failure occurs when an error causes a service to deviate from its defined specification. A
major concern when it comes to failure is that of silent data corruption (SDC). SDC occurs when
output or state is incorrect, but the error goes undetected. This can be particularly troublesome
for missile guidance systems, file-compression, and encryption algorithms. The on-chip error
13

detection evaluation approach used in this thesis focuses on detecting SDC of output signals for
selected benchmark circuits.

2.5

SEU Mitigation Techniques
Adverse affects of SEUs on FPGA designs can be reduced by applying various SEU miti-

gation techniques to the design. Many post-manufacturing SEU mitigation techniques have been
developed for SRAM-based FPGAs. Generally, concepts of redundancy, repair, error detection
and correction (EDAC), or the elimination of single point failures (SPF) are used to design SEU
mitigation techniques. The three SEU mitigation covered in this thesis are: TMR, configuration
scrubbing and user-memory scrubbing. While other SEU mitigation techniques exist, these SEU
mitigation techniques are common examples of ways to improve the reliability of an FPGA design,
and they are used in the experiments of this thesis.

2.5.1

Triple Modular Redundancy
TMR is a well-known SEU mitigation technique that involves triplicating the original cir-

cuit and inserting voters (see Figure 2.7). There are many ways TMR can be applied [27]. TMR can
be applied spatially or temporally [10]. Majority voters mask SEUs by propagating the dominant
output of the triplicated circuit. If at least two of three redundant circuits are operating correctly,
the output of the system will be correct as well. To avoid single point failures, voters themselves
are often triplicated as well [12]. TMR protects the designs from errors in the routing resources,
lookup tables, control signals, and internal state. While TMR overhead is at least 3× in area, it has
been shown to provide significant improvements in reliability on a number of FPGA circuits [28].
TMR cannot protect against SEU accumulation across more than one redundant copy. The
granularity of TMR affects the amount of SEUs a design can tolerate before failing; fine grain TMR
(i.e., TMR of the smallest components) is able to withstand more faults at the cost of additional
area and delay due to the insertion of more voters [29]. By placing voters throughout the design,
the granularity of TMR is made smaller. Figure 2.8 shows a fine grain TMR scheme that places
majority voters in feedback paths [12]. By triplicating a design into smaller partitions, SEU are
allowed to accumulate in ways that would otherwise cause the design to fail. That being said,
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Figure 2.7: Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR).

SEUs can still accumulate within the same partition causing TMR to fail. In order to prevent this
kind of failure, an SEU repair mechanism, such as scrubbing, must be combined with TMR [30].
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V

Figure 2.8: Fine-grain TMR with Voter Synchronization in the Feedback Path. So long as no more
than one TMR domain per partition is damaged, the output will be correct.

It is possible for a single SEU to cause the entire system to stop functioning correctly.
Any aspect of the design that is not protected with redundancy or fault tolerance presents an SPF
vulnerability. Within an FPGA’s architecture, it is also possible that an SEU breaks redundancy by
causing failures in multiple circuit copies [31, 32].
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2.5.2

Duplication with Compare
Another SEU mitigation technique based on redundancy is duplication with compare (DWC).

DWC involves duplicating a module and comparing the outputs of the two copies against each
other to detect errors. Similar to voters in TMR, detectors are inserted into the circuit to detect any
discrepancies. A major distinction between TMR and DWC is that TMR is able to mask errors by
propagating the majority vote of the three redundant circuits whereas DWC is only able to detect
that an error has occurred; DWC cannot mask errors. DWC has lower overhead than TMR because
only two copies are made rather than three. When DWC is employed, detectors themselves are
often duplicated as well to prevent errors in detection logic from being reported as errors in the
design under-test (i.e., a false-positive). When duplicate detectors are used, their output is encoded
so that an error is only reported with both detectors detect an error. Using DWC for on-line error detection has been shown to be an effective means of detecting errors caused by configuration
upsets in FPGA-based designs [33].

2.5.3

Configuration Scrubbing
Configuration scrubbing involves the rapid and continuous repair of upsets in configuration

memory as they occur [34]. Configuration scrubbing is performed without interfering with the
operation of an active design. In other words the application loaded onto the FPGA does not have
to go off line for configuration scrubbing to take place. As such, configuration scrubbing can only
repair upsets that affect bits of the programming data that are not changed by the design. Usermemories are not protected by configuration scrubbing. Bits that are protected include the contents
of look-up tables used to implement logic, interconnect and multiplexer configurations for routing
nets between components, and other constant configuration values.
Configuration scrubbing prevents the accumulation of more than one upset in configuration
memory that may break TMR. Configuration scrubbing can be performed in many different ways.
External readback configuration scrubbing compares the current configuration of the FPGA against
a golden copy to detect and repair SEU. External scrubbing has been shown to greatly reduce the
sensitive cross section of a design [35]. Internal configuration scrubbing uses frame-based error
correction codes (ECC) and global cyclical redundancy check (CRC) calculations to detect SEUs
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and correct them when possible [14]. SEUs that affect user-memory bits cannot be repaired by
configuration memory scrubbing. To repair SEUs that affect these bits, additional SEU mitigation
techniques need to be applied.

2.5.4

User-Memory Protection
Internal memories that contain large amounts of state pose a unique challenge when faced

with SEUs. Although a number of memory coding techniques can be used, these techniques do not
adequately protect the memory from the accumulation of multiple upsets within a single memory
word. This problem is especially prevalent in memories whose contents do not change very often
(such as read only memories) as there is greater potential risk of SEU accumulation. In order to
prevent the accumulation of upsets that may invalidate memory coding techniques, such as ECC,
some form of memory scrubbing may be used in environments where soft error rate (SER) is high
(e.g. space environments) [11].
Scrubbing BRAM bits repairs SEUs as they occur and prevents the failure of additional
protection mechanisms, such as TMR or ECC, that can result from the accumulation of SEUs.
One of the most common memories that may need to be protected with scrubbing are user block
memories called BRAM modules. These modules are user configurable and provide a limited
number of access ports to the associated BRAM bits. Protecting BRAM modules with scrubbing
can be challenging if all available ports are already in use. Figure 2.9 shows the contents of a
dual-port BRAM module being scrubbed. One port is dedicated to scrubbing and another port
is a dedicated access port for the design. In this case, the memory module is triplicated and the
majority vote between the three copies is written back to the memory to scrub away SEUs.
Scrubbing is performed in a three step process. First, a memory word is read out of memory. Second, the word is decoded and corrected through ECC or another form of memory protection. Finally, if an error is detected in the word, the corrected word is written back to memory to
overwrite the upsets. Scrubbing can be performed deterministically by iterating through all of the
words in memory, or probabilistically by scrubbing a memory word only when it is used by the
design [36].
Other memory protection techniques, such as ECC, can also benefit from scrubbing. Encoding is used to mask SEUs in ECC protected memory. Without correcting upsets in memory, by
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either overwriting them with new values or scrubbing them, eventually enough SEUs will accumulate to cause the ECC method to fail [11]. By providing memory scrubbing, memories affected by
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Figure 2.9: Internal BRAM Scrubbing

There are some limitations to the benefits that user-memory scrubbing provides. Additional
resources are consumed by scrubbing logic. This logic may also be vulnerable to failure if not
protected with SEU mitigation techniques. Also, memory that changes value often benefits less
from scrubbing because the risk of accumulating SEUs that would invalidate ECC is lower. The
benefits of scrubbing memory caches are limited because when an error is detected in a cache, the
cache can be easily be flushed and refreshed instead of being scrubbed [37]. Another limitation
of user memory scrubbing is that it can only repair errors that occur within a memory; it cannot
prevent a error from being written to memory.

2.5.5

Complementary SEU Mitigation
Complementary SEU mitigation and repair techniques work together to improve an FPGA

design’s fault-tolerance and prevent SEU failure modes from occurring. TMR masks SEUs to
prevent failure. Scrubbing repairs SEUs to prevent accumulation that would break TMR. The
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reliability of a system can be significantly improved when both TMR (fault masking) and configuration scrubbing (repair) are used together [28]. Without configuration scrubbing, the benefits of
TMR are limited (especially for long missions).

2.6

SEU Sensitivity Estimation
The likelihood of a design failing when a random upset occurs is the SEU sensitivity of an

FPGA design. There are many factors that contribute to the SEU sensitivity of an FPGA design
such as the size of the design and whether or not any SEU mitigation techniques were applied to
it. The main idea is that there are bits within an FPGA design that will cause the design to fail
if upset. These sensitive bits exist within the FPGA configuration memory for a particular design
and are most likely different for each FPGA design. Upsets in these bits cause a design to fail by
introducing the SEU failure modes discussed earlier into the design. The ratio of sensitive CRAMbits to non-sensitive CRAM-bits reflects the SEU sensitivity of a design. The likelihood of an SEU
occurring from radiation exposure also affects a design’s SEU sensitivity. This term attempts to
provide common ground between fault injection and radiation testing.
Knowing the SEU sensitivity of a design provides great insights to the potential risks of
radiation exposure for FPGA designs and the benefits of SEU mitigation techniques. Every design
has a different level of SEU sensitivity. SEU mitigation techniques need to be proven and the SEU
sensitivity of a mitigated design can provide supporting data or reveal vulnerabilities. As newer
FPGAs are released, changes in FPGA design SEU sensitivity can reflect the impact of changes
in the fabrication process, and FPGA architecture on reliability. The SEU sensitivity of a design
provides insight into every change and each new design.
SEU sensitivity of an FPGA design is often estimated by sampling a portion of CRAM-bits
on the FPGA for sensitivity. Because newer FPGAs now have tens of millions or more CRAM bits
and each design has numerous possible states, it is nearly impossible to exhaustively test each bit to
estimate the SEU sensitivity of a design. Instead, a portion of CRAM cells are sampled for sensitivity through fault injection and radiation testing. Fault injection involves artificially emulating an
SEU by altering the contents of CRAM-bits [15]. Radiation testing involves exposing the FPGA
design to accelerated radiation that causes SEUs [16]. A key component of most SEU sensitivity
testing approaches is being able to detect that a functional failure has occurred in the design. The
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next chapter discusses aspects of SEU sensitivity testing and the benefits and limitations of various
testing approaches.
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CHAPTER 3.

SEU SENSITIVITY TESTING APPROACHES

SEU sensitivity estimation plays an important role in radiation hardness assurance (RHA),
SEU mitigation technique validation, and in improving the fault-tolerance of FPGA designs. Missioncritical space applications have rigid requirements for system reliability. Radiation hardness assurance seeks to qualify devices for space. So much goes into qualifying an integrated circuit
for space [38]. Part of qualification includes SEU testing. Test guidelines and standards have
been written for radiation testing [4, 39]. The benefits of SEU mitigation techniques can be
proven through SEU sensitivity estimation. Additional unanticipated vulnerabilities can be exposed through SEU sensitivity estimation.
In order to estimate the SEU sensitivity of an FPGA design, there must be a means of
observing failure events caused by SEUs, and the factors that lead up to failure must be recorded
for analysis [16]. Many approaches have been developed to estimate the SEU sensitivity of an
FPGA design through fault injection and radiation testing. Fault injection mimics the behavior of
an SEU on the FPGA under test, and radiation testing exposes the FPGA to accelerated radiation
sources that cause SEUs within the FPGA. Various test setups have been created to configure fault
injection and radiation testing towards SEU sensitivity estimation of FPGA designs. This chapter
discusses common elements found in FPGA SEU sensitivity testing approaches. SEU sensitivity
testing approaches used in related works are presented and an on-chip error detection approach is
introduced. The limitations and benefits of each approach are discussed.

3.1

General Approach for SEU Sensitivity Testing
SEU sensitivity testing is event based, where the event is usually the occurrence of a func-

tional failure within the design. Most SEU sensitivity testing approaches depend on the ability
to detect when the design under test is not operating correctly [16]. Testing approaches for SEU
sensitivity estimation create an environment where a design can fail, and they measure and record
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the factors that lead up to failure for analysis. Common elements are found in most SEU sensitivity
testing approaches to support SEU sensitivity estimation.
There are five common elements found in most SEU sensitivity testing approaches. First,
the design under test must be active. Second, the output of a design under test is usually monitored
for errors. Third, the environment is set up to create possible failure conditions through fault
injection or radiation testing. Fourth, factors leading up to failure, such as the number of of injected
faults or amount of radiation exposure, are recorded for analysis. Finally, a method is provisioned
to place the design back into a known good state so that additional failure events can be observed.
In SEU sensitivity testing, the design is kept active so that functional failures can occur and
be detected. If a design sits idle, the effects of SEUs on the design may go unnoticed. Keeping
as much of the design active during SEU sensitivity testing as possible allows failures caused by
SEUs to propagate to the outputs of the design where they may be observed. Designs are typically
kept active using a set of input vectors [16]. A clock signal is also usually provided to the design
as well.
Two main methods are used to monitor the outputs of a design for errors. First, the outputs
of a design may be compared against a set of golden output vectors that match the expected behavior of the design. Second, the outputs of a design may be compared against those of an identical
design instance that operates in lockstep with the design under test. If any disagreement is found,
a functional failure is detected and reported. Other methods for monitoring outputs could include
monitoring checksums produced by the design.
Failure conditions are introduced to the active design through fault injection or radiation
testing. Typically, only the design under test is exposed to factors that cause SEUs. Test control
unit, functional error detection logic, and the golden output vectors or lockstep design instance are
commonly separated from the design under test to make them fault-immune. For example, many
SEU sensitivity testing approaches place the design under test on a separate FPGA. This FPGA is
then injected with faults or placed in an accelerated radiation beam so that SEUs only occur within
the design under test and not in other parts of the test setup.
The factors that lead up to a functional failure are recorded for analysis. For fault injection,
the total number of fault injected and the total number of failures observed may be collected. This
can be used to estimate the sensitivity of the design. Also the particular bit injected prior to a
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functional failure may be recorded for reproducibility and failure characterization. For radiation
testing, the total radiation exposure of the design and the total number of observed failures may
be collected. Radiation exposure is usually measured in terms of fluence, and the SEU sensitivity
of the design is approximated by the cross section of the design, or number of failures divided by
total fluence.
Many failure events must be observed for the collected data to be statistically significant
and representative of the SEU sensitivity for a particular design [15,16]. To support the observation
of multiple failure events, most SEU sensitivity testing approaches provision a method of resetting
the design, or resynchronizing it into a known good state so that additional failure events can be observed. Any necessary control signals are provided to the design. The process of resynchronizing
the design for the next test run is often automated to assist in rapid data collection.
Most testing approaches organizes these five common elements into a test setup with an
accompanying test fixture to support SEU sensitivity testing. The general setup for SEU sensitivity
testing is described in the next section.

3.2

General Setup for SEU Sensitivity Testing
While each approach is different, the test setup for many SEU sensitivity estimation ap-

proaches is very similar. Each test setup typically has a host computer that interfaces with a test
fixture. The test fixture holds the FPGA design under test and contains additional components to
support the experiment. Figure 3.1 depicts the general setup of an SEU sensitivity test and the
common components of a test fixture. Clock and control signals drive the design under test and
provide a means to reset or resynchronize the design. A test control unit orchestrates the operation
of the design under test with the rest of the test fixture. It keeps the design active by managing
input vectors or can make sure the design operates in lockstep with a golden design instance if
used. Functional error detection mechanism provides the means of detecting functional errors in
real time. This mechanism usually compares the output of the design under test against a set of
golden output vectors, or a fault-immune instance of the design operating in lockstep outside the
scope of fault injection or radiation testing. If a disagreement is found, a failure is reported. This
mechanism is especially important because most approaches depend on the ability to detect errors
in order to collect good data. The external interface provides a way to communicate with the host
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computer. Other common aspects incorporated into a test setup may include automated logging on
the host computer and using heartbeats or watchdogs, (e.g., provided by the test control unit), to
ensure that the design is still operational [16].

Test Fixture
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and
Control
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Golden Output Vectors
or
Design Instance in
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Functional
Error
Detection
Mechanism

Test
Control
Unit

External
Interface

Host
Computer
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Scope of Fault Injection
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Figure 3.1: General Setup for SEU Sensitivity Test

It is important that design instances operate in lockstep so that they can be compared against
each other to detect functional failures. When designs operate in lockstep, no instance advances
to next computation until all instances have completed the previous computation, and all instances
produce outputs in the same order. For many FPGA designs this is not hard to accomplish since
computations usually have a predictable data flow path. So long as predictable design instances
begin execution on the same clock cycle, they will operate in parallel. When design instances
use roll back check pointing or perform out-of-order computation, a more complicated mechanism
must be used to keep the design instances in sync [40]. The state machine can be used to ensure the
synchronous operation of design instances and tag the appropriate signal samples for comparison
in the case of out-of-order computation.
One of the most important SEU evaluation elements is the functional error detection mechanism. When evaluating the SEU sensitivity of a design, failure events are collected and recorded.
To evaluate the sensitivity of a design to configuration upsets, there must be some way of know24

ing when the design has experience a functional failure. Many mechanisms can be used to detect
functional failures but their primary goal is the same: to detect when an error has occurred within
the design.
Many testing approaches separate the design under test from the other test fixture components so that the scope of fault injection or radiation testing only extends to the design under
test and nothing else. This is typically done by placing the design under test on its own FPGA.
Approaches that do not place the test control unit, error detection logic, golden output vectors,
etcetera on the same FPGA as the design under test will be referred to as off-chip error detection
approaches; whereas an on-chip error detection approach places additional test components on the
same FPGA as the design under test.

3.3

SEU Sensitivity Testing Examples
The approaches discussed in this section specifically focus on estimating SEU sensitivity

of SRAM-based FPGAs in harsh radiation environments and estimating the reliability benefits of
SEU mitigation techniques. These approaches use an FPGA in fault injection or radiation testing
to estimate the reliability of an FPGA design on a specific target FPGA. The reliability benefits
of SEU mitigation techniques are estimated by comparing the estimated SEU sensitivity of a mitigated and an unmitigated version of the same design.
Fault injection and radiation testing are common methods for estimating the SEU sensitivity
of a design operating on an FPGA. SEU sensitivity is defined as how prone to failure a given
design is when an SEU occurs. The design operates on the FPGA while the FPGA undergoes
fault injection or radiation testing. The rate of design failure with respect to injected faults or
radiation exposure is the primary indicator used to determine SEU sensitivity. For fault injection,
SEU sensitivity is typically measured in terms of mean upsets to failure (MUTF) but can also be
measured in terms of the percentage of upsets that cause the design to fail. A lower MUTF or
a higher percentage of sensitive bits means a greater SEU sensitivity. For radiation testing, SEU
sensitivity is typically measured in terms of cross-section. The larger the cross section, the greater
the SEU sensitivity.
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Several testing approaches used in related works to estimate SEU sensitivity are presented
in this section. Their test setup is describe and some results are included from experiments that use
them. Benefits and limitations of each approach are discussed compared against each other.

3.3.1

FT-UNSHADES
FT-UNSHADES [41] emulates fault injections in ASIC circuitry using an FPGA as a fault

injection emulation platform. This evaluation approach uses a formal verification tool to ensure
that the ASIC netlist and its corresponding FPGA netlist maintain and guarantee equivalence, and
then uses partial reconfiguration to inject faults into the user flip-flops. This approach places a
golden and a faulty instance of the design on the same FPGA along with comparison and test
control logic. Test vectors are loaded externally and faults are limited to flip-flops within the faulty
instance of the design. Figure 3.2 shows the test setup used by FT-UNSHADES. Notice that only
a single FPGA is used to implement this fault emulation approach.

Figure 3.2: FT-UNSHADES test setup. Figure taken from [41].
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Using this approach a LEON2 soft processor without mitigation was compared against
an XTMR version (i.e., Xilinx automated TMR), and a fault tolerant (i.e., LEON3-FT) version.
The most sensitive components of the processor were identified and protection provided by the
mitigated version was verified [41]. This platform is used in [42] to prepare designs for radiation
testing. The fault injection emulation approaches presented in [43] and [44] are similar to that of
FT-UNSHADES.
This is an on-chip error detection approach, and is similar to the on-chip error detection
approach described in Chapter 4. It is on-chip because the test control logic, lockstep golden design
instance and the error detection mechanism are all on the same FPGA. The biggest difference
between this approach and the one described in Chapter 4 is that this approach limits faults to the
design instance under test and the other approach allows faults anywhere on the FPGA.
Using an FPGA to emulate fault injection in ASIC circuitry accelerates ASIC fault-tolerance
testing, but since faults are limited to flip-flips, only a small portion of FPGA architecture is included in an SEU sensitivity estimation obtained through this approach. This approach does not
consider the effects of SEUs on logic or routing in an FPGA design. This approach is not designed
for use in radiation testing. However, only a single FPGA is needed to implement this approach
making it less expensive to implement than a multi-FPGA test setup. The approach could also
feasibly be implemented on a ready made FPGA evaluation board.

3.3.2

FLIPPER
FLIPPER [45] is a fault injection approach that injects a fault using partial reconfiguration

and uses stimuli and golden values derived from HDL simulation to determine when the design has
failed. If the output of the FPGA does not match the expected golden values for the provided input
stimulus, a failure has occurred. FLIPPER consists of two boards: the main board that manages
fault injection, and a device under test board that contains the FPGA under test (see Figure 3.3).
In a case study, faults were injected every 18ms and allowed to accumulate until a functional fault was detected. For each injected fault, 26,000 testbench cycles are executed. Using
the approach, the MUTF of various mitigation schemes were evaluated for an FPGA design. The
plain design, without mitigation, had a MUTF of 337 accumulated faults. The Xilinx TMR version
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(a) Main Board

(b) DUT Board

Figure 3.3: FLIPPER test fixture consisting of two boards. Images taken from [45].

had a MUTF of 1,330 accumulated faults. Based on these results, Xilinx TMR without scrubbing
reduced the SEU sensitivity of the evaluated design 3.9×.
Having a separate test board provides for extendability of the approach to newer devices
and helps reduce reoccurring engineering costs [15]. The main board contains an FPGA which
can be reused for new FPGAs, but at some point the main board would need to be updated with
a newer FPGA. This approach leverages HDL simulation tools to provide stimulus and compare
device outputs against golden output vectors. An advantage of using test vectors is that only a
single target FPGA is needed.

3.3.3

SLAAC-1V
The SLAAC-1V board [46] is an FPGA fault injection and radiation testing approach that

utilizes three FPGAs: one as the FPGA under test, one as a golden FPGA that runs in parallel
lockstep with the FPGA under test and is failure-immune, and one for comparison, reconfiguration, and control logic of the other two. This approach allows for off-chip error detection of very
complex designs without having to precompute golden test vectors. So long as the inputs are the
same, the outputs of the golden and the device under test FPGAs should be the same also, except
in the case of failure. This is an off-chip error detection approach because error detection logic is
not on the same FPGA as the design under test. The golden lockstep design is also not on the same
FPGA as the design under test.
A linear feedback shift register (LFSR) design was evaluated for SEU sensitivity using this
approach. A fault was injected in the device under test every 267us. Between faults the circuit is
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Figure 3.4: SLAAC-1V setup diagram. Figure taken from [46]. X1 and X2 are the golden and
device under test FPGAs respectively. X0 is the comparator FPGA.

cycled and tested for discrepancies with the golden. All 5.9 million configuration bits on Xilinx
Virtex XCV1000 were exhaustively fault injected. It was found that the tested LFSR design was
relatively insensitive to injected faults.
The SLAAC-1V board was used in a later experiment that compared the SEU sensitivity
found in fault injection against that found in proton radiation testing [25]. In this experiment,
several versions of a multiplier and LFSR were tested. A 36-bit and 72-bit multiplier, and a 72bit LFSR circuit demonstrated a 4.0%, 14.7%, and a 4.8% sensitivity rate respectively in fault
injection, and a 4.9%, 17.2&, and 5.0% sensitivity rate in radiation testing respectively. This
experiment helps to validate this approach by showing that fault injection data agrees with the
radiation testing data.
In [10] several SEU mitigation techniques were compared using the SLAAC-V1 board
approach to gather fault injection data. The fault injection campaign used in this experiment simulated configuration scrubbing by correcting the injected fault after checking for output errors.
TMR and scrubbing in this experiment reduced the SEU sensitivity of a 36-bit counter and two
finite state machine 2-3×.
One advantage of this approach is that allows two test designs to operate in lockstep. For
complex FPGA designs, comparing the output of two designs operating in lockstep can be easier
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than comparing the output of a single instance against a set of golden output vectors. Unlike
FT-UNSHADES, this approach places comparison logic on a separate FPGA. Doing so allows
faults to be injected anywhere in the FPGA under test without disrupting the operation of the test
setup. It also makes it possible to use the test setup in radiation testing. Some drawbacks of this
approach are that multiple target FPGAs are needed and that a entire new board would need to be
re-engineered to test newer FPGAs.

3.3.4

XRTC-V5FI
The XRTC-V5FI [47] approach consists of three main boards: the XRTC motherboard, the

Xilinx Vertex 5 FPGA under test daughter card, and an external memory card (see Figure 3.5).
There are two FPGAs on the mother board: the ConfigMon, and the FuncMon. The ConfigMon
FPGA controls all of the reconfiguration and rapid fault injection, and the FuncMon is dedicated
to detecting functional failures in the FPGA under test. Rather than compare the outputs of a
design against external golden values to detect failures, this approach compares the outputs of
two identical designs instances on the FPGA under test against each other. Several signals are
compared externally between the two, these signals are sent to the FuncMon FPGA. It is not likely
that a single fault will affect both instances in exactly the same way, and since the comparison
logic is separated from the FPGA under test, failure of the error-detection logic is unlikely as well.
Because the comparison and error detection logic is not on the same chip as the FPGA
design being tested, this approach is considered an off-chip error detection approach. However,
the concept of having two instances of the same design on the FPGA under test, operating in
lockstep, where both instances are vulnerable failure is an important aspect of the on-chip error
detection approach presented in Chapter 4. Rather than have one design instance serve as the design
under test and another instance serve as a golden copy that is failure-immune for comparison, both
instances are placed under test. If either copy fails, than a failure has occurred. This is an important
concept that is also central to DWC SEU mitigation [33]. It is the driving concept behind an onchip error detection approach for SEU sensitivity estimation.
The XRTC-V5FI board has been used in several experiments. One experiment evaluated
the SEU sensitivity of various soft-core processors [47]. This experiment used fault injection to
exhaustively test each bit on the target FPGA for SEU sensitivity. Several benchmark programs
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Figure 3.5: XRTC-V5FI test fixture. Image taken from [47]. The XTRC motherboard (a), a Xilinx
V5QV daughter card(b), and a PROM memory card (c) are displayed.

were tested on each of the soft-core processors. In another experiment [28], three circuits were
tested using this approach with fault injection and one design was further tested with radiation
testing. It was found that TMR data from fault injection matched radiation data within the error
bounds. A slight discrepancy was found between non-TMR fault injection data and radiation data,
but that was attributed to radiation exposure during book keeping activities.
Like FLIPPER, the XRTC-V5FI SEU sensitivity testing approach uses a separate daughter
card for the device under test. This reduces reoccurring engineering costs and allows the same
motherboard to use when testing additional target FPGAs. Unlike the SLACC-V1 approach, which
places identical FPGA design instances on two separate FPGAs, the XRTC-V5FI approach places
identical FPGA design instance on the same FPGA. This reduces the number of target FPGAs
needed to do lockstep comparison for functional error detection, but it also reduces the size of
FPGA designs that can be tested using this approach since both instances must fit on the same
FPGA together. This approach also allows for separate biasing of the test daughter card, which is
helpful for SEE testing in an accelerated radiation beam tests [16].
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3.3.5

Multiple Development Boards
[48] reduced the overhead of developing a custom test platform by using two ready-made

Xilinx KC705 development boards to evaluate the feasibility of using the GTX transceivers on
Xilinx 7-series FPGAs in high energy physics experiments. This experiment used one development
board as a service board and the other development board as the device under test board. There
were 13 multi-gigabit transceiver lanes between the two boards used to send and receive data. At
least one custom crossover board was made to enable coupling of the available transceivers. Both
boards had frame generator and frame checker logic operating on the FPGA fabric to continuously
fill the 3.125 Gb/s of available bandwidth for each lane. It was found through proton radiation
testing that the MTTF of a single lane is 2.02 ×107 seconds or 234 days of continuous operations.
This was lower than the acceptable failure rate for the targeted application. However, some of
the failures were attributed to unmitigated FPGA logic on the device under test board used to
capture and log multi-lane errors. This experiment shows ready made FPGA boards being used
for SEU sensitivity estimation and suggests that any on-chip test logic should have SEU mitigation
techniques applied to it where possible.

Figure 3.6: Multiple development board test setup. Image taken from [48].
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One advantage of this approach is that it uses ready-made FPGA development boards,
which can be more cost effective than designing custom test boards. A disadvantage of this approach is that two development boards are needed. Interfacing between two development boards
can be challenging and would need to be redesigned for each new development board used. Also,
as newer FPGAs are made available, the cost of a single development board may increase, making
a multiple development board approach cost prohibitive.

3.4

Motivation for an On-Chip Error Detection Approach
Each of the approaches presented carry with them a number of advantages. Using on-

chip error detection to estimate SEU sensitivity of FPGA designs is driven by the possibility of
combining the advantages from all of these approaches into a low-cost single FPGA solution that
is easier to implement. The on-chip error detection approach proposed by this thesis combines the
following advantages from each of the approaches covered in this chapter.
• FT-UNSHADES – the entire test fixture is on a single FPGA.
• FLIPPER – test vectors can be used to stimulate a design and detect errors.
• SLAAC-1V – two or more complex designs can operate in lockstep for error detection.
• XTRC-V5FI – multiple designs instances can be placed on the same FPGA.
• Multiple Development Boards – ready-made development boards can be used.
Each of these aspects reduces cost and increases the flexibility of the on-chip error detection
approach for estimating SEU sensitivity of FPGA designs. By only using a single FPGA and by
using ready-made development boards, the cost of entry is greatly reduced, especially for higher
end FPGAs. Being able to use test vectors or another design instance operating in parallel to detect
errors makes this approach easier to adapt and implement for various designs. Like the other
approaches covered in this chapter, valuable SEU sensitivity estimations can be collected using an
on-chip error detection approach.
Another strong advantage of using on-chip error detection to estimate SEU sensitivity of a
design is that many instances of a smaller FPGA design can be tested all at once. Smaller FPGA
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designs are typically less sensitive to configuration upsets due to their reduced area usage in the
FPGA. Gathering statically significant data from fault injection and radiation testing of a single
instance can be challenging. This is due to the high number of random upsets that must occur
before the design fails and the large number of failures that must be observed for the data to be
significant. One way to work around this issue is to fill up the FPGA with many design instances
and record whenever an instance fails. This effectively parallelizes testing and accelerates data
acquisition for fault injection and radiation testing. This approach is hard to implement with offchip error detection due to the limited number of I/O ports available on an FPGA. On-chip error
detection compares the outputs of design instances internally without using I/O resources.
On-chip error detections comes with some disadvantages. Because multiple instances are
placed on the same FPGA, designs that consume more than half of the available resources cannot
be evaluated using this method. A false-positive is an error reported by the error detection logic
that did not actually occur in the design under test. A false negative occurs when an error in the
design under test goes undetected by the error detection logic. The error detection logic itself
is vulnerable to failure (e.g. returning false-positives or false-negatives) because it too is on the
FPGA under test and within the scope of fault injection and radiation testing. Few I/O resources
are not included in the evaluation because outputs of the design under test are compared internally.
Because no external golden value is available, it is difficult to validate the on-chip error detection
logic. While off-chip error detection approaches may provide a more accurate evaluation, onchip error detection is a useful means of roughly approximating the reliability benefits of SEU
mitigation techniques and identifying issues that limit the benefits of SEU mitigation techniques.
In the on-chip error approach proposed, the components found in the test fixture of Figure 3.1 are all placed on the same FPGA as the design under test. The entire test fixture is placed
within the scope of fault injection and radiation testing. This presents interesting implications for
collecting good data. For example, since the error detection logic is also exposed to fault injection
and radiation exposure, confidence of results may be negatively affected. Challenges and proposed
solutions for using on-chip error detection to estimate the SEU sensitivity of FPGA designs are
discussed in the next chapter. Test implementations for three FPGA designs using on-chip error
detection logic are also included in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4.

ON-CHIP ERROR DETECTION APPROACH

On-chip error detection has the same basic elements as other SEU evaluation approaches,
but it places most of the needed logic on the same FPGA as the design under test. The basic layout
of an on-chip error detection test fixture is shown in Figure 4.1. Clocking and control signal are
used to drive the design instances and the additional circuitry needed for on-chip error detection. A
test state machine is used to orchestrate the parallel operation of design instances and provide for
other needs. The design instances are copies of the design under test and functional error detection
logic is used to determine if an error has occurred in any instance. To monitor the error status
within the flow of fault injection or radiation testing, an external monitor interface is provided.
This chapter describes the implications of placing most of the test fixture on the same FPGA
as the design under test. Doing so places the test circuitry within the scope of fault injection and
radiation testing. To maximize the utility of this approach, special design consideration must be
made. To reduce SEU induced failures within the on-chip error detection circuitry, SEU mitigation
techniques such as TMR and scrubbing are applied to all SEU evaluation elements. State machines,
functional error detection mechanisms, external interfaces, etc., all have some type of redundancy
or fault tolerance built into them. To make sure that the test fixture and design under test are not
halted by an SEU, a heartbeat is also made available for external monitoring. Every effort is made
to maximize the accuracy of this approach. Implementing each of the basic components of an SEU
sensitivity test fixture for on-chip error detection is discussed in this chapter. Designs used in the
experiments of this thesis are also presented and the configuration of the on-chip error detection
test fixture for each design is discussed.

4.1

Clocking and Control Signals
Clocking and control signals are typically high fanout nets within an FPGA that connect to

many parts of an FPGA design and have a large impact on functionality. For on-chip error detec-
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tion, clock signals drive SEU evaluation elements as well as all of the design instances. Control
signals, such as reset or clock enable, can also cover a large area of the FPGA. Because these nets
are so large, special care must be taken to make sure that when an SEU affects these signals it
does not cause a system wide failure. If no redundancy is applied to these signals, they present a
significant SPF vulnerability to the functionality of the system.
Using redundant clock signals improves on-chip error detection, but also introduces challenges. If redundant clock signals are used, it is important that all signals are in phase with each
other. TMR in FPGAs requires that all three TMR domains operate synchronously with each
other. If the TMR domains are out of phase with each other, majority voters will not be able to
select the correct output between the TMR domains. TMR across clock domains requires special
considerations as well [49]. For on-chip error detection, redundant clocks should be used where
applicable.
Most FPGA development boards provide readily available clock sources that can be used
for on-chip error detection through mitigation. A single clock source can be split into three inphase clock networks by passing the incoming signal through three separate global buffers after
entering the FPGA. This is similar to the mitigation approach used for global signals in [42] where
singular signals are triplicated after being registered. This mitigation method can be used for other
control signals as well and provides redundant in-phase clock networks with a reasonably low
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impact on SEU sensitivity. Using this mitigation method removes the overhead of creating three
separate sets of in-phase signals.

4.2

Test State Machine
A test state machine is used by on-chip error detection to control design instances and

provide for other needs. The state machine will ensure that the design instances operate in lockstep.
A heartbeat is also managed by the test state machine to indicate the continued operation of the
test fixture and design instances. If the design instances are dependent on input stimulus or golden
output vectors are available, the test state machine can manage provided input stimulus and select
the appropriate golden output vector for comparison. The test state machine can also arbitrate
between on-chip error detection and external monitoring by managing the error status registers
and capturing samples for off-chip error verification.
A heartbeat is used by on-chip error detection to filter out common mode failures (e.g.
design instances failing in exactly the same way). The heartbeat indicates the continued operation
of the test fixture and design instances. It is possible for a single SEU to halt the operation of the
test fixture, disrupt the operation of more than one design instance, or adversely affect the entire
system. If an SEU affects all design instances in exactly the same way, it is likely that the design
instances have ceased operation. In the case of halting design instances, functional error detection
may not report an error because their output signals may still agree, but the heartbeat signal would
reflect the failure. The heartbeat signal can be a counter that is incremented by the state machine
only when the design instances have reached a certain checkpoint (e.g., finished a computation,
completed a set of input vectors, concluded a program run). This counter is made available for
external monitoring. Having a heartbeat signal indicates that the experiment is still operational.
If the design instances depend on input stimulus vectors or golden output vectors, the test
state machine can control which input vector is provided to the design instances, or which output
vector is used for functional error detection. These test vectors may be available off-chip from
memory modules, JTAG or UART interfaces, etc., or they can also be placed on-chip with the test
fixture. On-chip test vectors must be small enough to fit into the FPGA, and they must be protected
by TMR and scrubbing or some other type of fault-tolerance. Mitigation is applied so that SEUs
in on-chip test vectors have minimal influence on error detection results. The state machine can
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act as a memory controller into provided test vectors and orchestrate the administration of the test
vectors.
The test state machine also arbitrates the interaction between on-chip error detection and
the external monitor interface. The error status register and heartbeat signal are made available for
external monitoring. A design output sample may be wanted for external error verification, or the
external monitor may want to reset the design instances. The test state machine can capture the
heartbeat signal for external monitoring and reset the error state register after it has been sampled.
It can also capture a design output sample at set intervals for external error verification and reset the
design instances as requested by external monitoring. The state machine enhances the interaction
of on-chip error detection with external observation of the experiment.
Like the other SEU evaluation components of on-chip error detection, the test state machine
must also be mitigated to improve the functionality of the test fixture. There are many ways to
mitigate a finite state machine. State encoding can be used or TMR can be applied to the entire state
machine. TMR has demonstrated significant improvement in reliability of finite state machines
over alternate encoding methods [10]. Figure 4.2 shows how TMR can be applied to the test state
machine. The output signals and registers of the state machine are fed into redundant copies and
the majority vote between all three copies are used in the next state logic of the state machine.
Configuration scrubbing also benefits the reliability of the test state machine by repairing upsets
as they occur. This prevents the accumulation of upsets that might break TMR. By mitigating the
test state machine in this manner, error detection results are less likely to be adversely influenced
by SEUs in the test state machine.

4.3

Design Instances
On-chip error detection is used to evaluate the effects of SEUs on a target design. The

entire test fixture is built to detect failures within an FPGA design caused by an SEU in the design.
Significant effort is made to ignore SEUs within the test fixture itself, as the effects of SEUs in the
target design is of primary interest. The design under test is integral to the purpose of on-chip error
detection and must be instanced within the test fixture.
One or more instances of the design under test may be placed within the on-chip test fixture.
If input and output test vectors are provided, a single instance of the design under test can be used
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for SEU evaluation. When test vectors are not available, two or more instances of the design must
be used. Either golden output vectors are used for comparison or the redundant copies of the design
act as golden copies for each other. If ever the design instances disagree with the each other, or
with the expected output vectors, a functional failure is detected. Typically, more than one design
instance is used for on-chip error detection.
Placing more instances within the test fixture increases data acquisition but also increases
functional error detection complexity. More design instances consume a larger area on the FPGA,
thus as SEUs occur they are more likely to affect an instance of the design. Increasing the number
of instances increases the SEU sensitivity of the entire test fixture; more failures can be observed
with the same number of injected faults or exposed radiation. Thus smaller designs can be instanced hundreds of times in a single test fixture to accelerate data acquisition. Collecting data
faster is useful because of time limitations and the cost of radiation testing. However, increasing the number of instances complicates functional error detection, control signal distribution, and
timing closure as more signals need to be handled.
The design instances and the rest of the on-chip error detection test fixture must fit on the
same FPGA. If a design consumes too many resources, there will not be enough available for
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multiple design instances and the additional logic needed for on-chip error detection. This limits
the number of designs that can be tested using this approach.
When evaluating multiple version of the same design, the same test fixture should be used
for each evaluation. It is common to test an unmitigated version of a design and compare it against
an SEU mitigated version [42]. Either multiple instances of the unmitigated design or multiple
instances of the mitigated design are instanced together. Versions are never mixed for testing,
(e.g., one instance of unmitigated and one instance of mitigated in the same test fixture). If a
simplex design were being tested the triplicated control signals from the test state machine would
be reduced to a singular signals to drive the design under test, and output comparison signals
would fan out to redundant error detection mechanisms; only one of the triplicated clock networks
would drive the design. For a TMR version of the same design, the same test fixture would be used;
however, since the top level ports and output comparison signals of the TMR design are triplicated,
triplicate test logic signals are not reduced to singular signals to drive the design under test. The
same number of instances could be used when testing different versions of a design to keep the
on-chip error detection overhead roughly the same.

4.4

Functional Error Detection
On-chip error detection uses comparison logic to detect functional failures within a design.

Design instances are compared against each other, or outputs of the design are compared against
golden test vectors. If any disagreement is found, an error is detected. The concepts covered
here are very similar to those used by DWC [33]. Select signals from the design are used for
comparison. Thanks to the flexibility of FPGA fabric, the design space for comparison schemes
and comparison logic implementation is very large. This section covers important aspects and
possible implementations of comparison logic for use in on-chip error detection.

4.4.1

Signal Selection
Select signals from an FPGA design are used for comparison, to detect functional failures.

These signals will be compared against those of other design instances, or golden output vectors,
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on a clock-by-clock basis to provide fast error detection. There is no standard as to which signals
should be selected for comparison.
Not every signal within a design instance can be compared against those of other instances
at the same time. Doing so would consume too many resources and not provide accurate results
because not all of a design is active at once. If an error occurs within an FPGA design, it is likely
that it will propagate to the outputs of a design [16], or be reflected in other significant signals such
as the bus lines of a soft core processor. On-chip error detection selects significant signals of a
design for comparison. These signals are compared on a clock-by-clock basis synchronous to the
operation of the design. If a disagreement is found among these signals, the error status register is
set and remains set to signify that an error has occurred.
Whichever signals are selected for comparison should reflect the operation of the design.
Selected signals should be active when the design is active. The output signals of a design are a
good candidate for selection, but do not necessarily reflect proper operation of the design. Consider
for example the output signals of a soft core processor. If only the console output is compared,
computations that never reach the console will not be compared. Too granular a selection may be
an unwise choice as well. If intermediate computation is done out of order, but the result is the
same, comparing individual registers may not produce accurate results either.
Selecting fewer signals for comparison reduces the size of functional error detection logic,
but also reduces the chance of detecting an error. Selecting more signals for comparison increases
the likelihood of detecting and error, but also increases the size of comparison logic. If many
signals are compared, a large reduction network is needed to reduce the error flags to a single
output [33].

4.4.2

Comparison Schemes
The selected signals of design instances can be compared in a variety of ways. Three of

primary interest are: a one-to-one comparison scheme, a one-to-many comparison scheme, and
a cascaded one-to-one comparison scheme. In a one-to-one comparison scheme there are only
two instances of the design, and their selected signals are compared against each other. This is
good choice for large designs. In a one-to-many comparison scheme, the selected signals of one
instance are compared against those of many other instances. This is helpful when a small design
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must be replicated many times to fill the FPGA. Finally, a cascaded one-to-one comparison scheme
creates two chains of design instances, where the output of one instance feeds into the inputs of
another, and only compared the selected signals of the last instances on each chain. This reduces
the size of comparison logic by allowing errors to propagate through the individuals chains to the
last instances on the chains. These three comparison schemes are later used in the evaluation of
three benchmark designs.

4.4.3

Functional Error Detection Mechanisms
One of the most important parts of the on-chip error detection test fixture is the functional

error detection mechanism. Having this mechanism on-chip provides great flexibility, but like the
other components it too must be protected from the negative effects of SEUs that could skew the
reported error results. There are two main methods that can be used to protect on-chip functional
error detection from SEUs: through TMR or DWC. Figure 4.3 shows a functional error detection
logic that if protected with TMR and another mechanism that is protected by DWC. Functional
error detection logic compares and reduces the outputs of the design under test and the golden
design to a single bit that indicates whether or not a functional error has occured. The TMR
protected circuit triplicates the functional error detection logic and votes on the output of the three
copies to mask any SEU within the error detection logic. The DWC protected circuit duplicates the
functional error detection logic and masks SEU in the detection logic by only reporting an error
when both copies report an error at the same time.
The protection method that reports the fewest false-positive or false-negative results is the
one that should be used for on-chip error detection. Several of the experiments included in this
thesis are set up to estimate the SEU sensitivity of a design using either a TMR protected or a DWC
protected functional error detection mechanism. A comparison is made between the approaches
based on the returned results.

4.5

External Monitor Interface
To facilitate external monitoring of the error status, an error status register is used to indi-

cate whether or not an error has occurred. Functional error-detection logic operates on-chip at the
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Figure 4.3: TMR Protected and DWC Protected Functional Error Detection Mechanisms

same rate as the design under test. An error may only be detected for a single clock cycle. The
error status of the design under test is typically polled at a much slower rate through the external
monitor interface. The error status register begins low and when an error is detected by the on-chip
functional error detection logic the register is then set and remains set so that the next time the
register is polled externally, the error can be reported. Like the other components of on-chip error
detection, this register should also be protected through redundancy.
Any number of communication protocols can be used to externally monitor the error status
of a design under test. JTAG and UART are simple communication standards that can be used to
interface between the test fixture and an external host. For the experiments in this thesis, JTAG is
used to periodically read the error status register of a design to collect data for analysis.

4.6

False Positive Bias
Due to high fan in and single point failures in the routing of reduction networks [33], an

SEU in the reduction network can cause a false-positive to be reported (i.e., an error in the error
detection logic that is reported as an error in the design under test). The following reasons suggest
that an SEU in the functional error detection logic is more likely to cause a false-positive than to
mask an actual error in the design under test (i.e., a false-negative). First, an SEU in the reduction
network of the functional error detection logic may cause an error to be reported. Second, an SEU
in the reduction network may prevent a portion of the comparison signals from being monitored,
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Figure 4.4: False-Positive Bias: An SEU in the functional error detection will either cause falsepositive error to be reported (left), or disconnect a portion of the reduction network while the rest
of network prevents a false-negative (right).

in which case the rest of the error detection network is still on-line. Theses cases are depicted in
Figure 4.4. With part of the error detection logic disable, part of the network is still listening for
errors. Error are detected on significant output signals of the design. When an SEU occurs within
the design, a single fault is introduced. As this fault causes an error to propagate to the output
signals being monitored for errors, it is likely that the original single fault will manifest as multiple
bits disagreeing between design under test and golden values. Finally, when an error occurs within
a design, it will likely manifest for more than a single clock cycle, which gives on-chip functional
error detection logic more opportunity to detect the failure. Thus an SEU in the functional error
detection logic may be more likely to cause a false-positive than a false-negative. The reduction
network is protected by redundancy to try and minimize the number of false-positives that are
reported.
False-positives in the results represent the SEU sensitivity of the test fixture logic. These
results are mixed into the actual failures detected in the design. Thus a portion of the SEU sensitivity estimate reported by on-chip error detection is attributed to SEUs in the test fixture logic
itself, and the SEU sensitivity estimate is actually an overestimate because of this influence.
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4.7

Minimal Influence on Results
When the SEU sensitivity of a design is tested with on-chip error detection, a portion of the

SEU sensitivity reported is caused by SEUs in the test fixture logic itself. This sensitivity overhead
influences the results and can make it difficult to estimate the difference in SEU sensitivity between
the baseline unmitigated an mitigated versions of a design. A very large overhead shared between
two different estimates makes the difference between the estimates look small. For example, say
a design was estimated to be 20% sensitive (i.e., one in five SEUs causes a failure) and another
design was estimated to be 11% sensitive (i.e., one in approximately nine SEUs causes a failure),
but there is a shared test fixture sensitivity of 10%. When comparing the two designs, it appears
that the second design is only 1.8× less sensitive than the first even though considering the shared
overhead, the second design is actually 2× less sensitive than the first. This effect is lessened
the smaller the overhead becomes. Figure 4.5 demonstrates what happens as the false-positive
overhead of the test fixture is reduced.
In designing an on-chip test fixture, great care should be taken to minimize the SEU sensitivity of the test fixture itself so as to not skew the results. This is done by applying the techniques
described in this chapter to the on-chip test fixture: triplicating the clock and control signals, triplicating the test control state machine, adding redundancy to the functional error detection mechanism and being selective in the number and importance of signals used for comparison to detect
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failures. By reducing the influence of the test fixture on the reported the detected errors, the results
become more meaningful and targeted to the actual design being tested.

4.8

On-Chip Error Detection Benchmark Design Testing
The experiments in this paper accomplish three main goals. First, they demonstrate the in-

dividual and combined benefits of complementary SEU mitigation techniques. Second, they compare results obtained from TMR protected and DWC protected functional error detection mechanisms to try and determine which approach is better. Finally, they compare the SEU sensitivity of
FPGA designs on two different FPGA architectures with and without SEU mitigation techniques
applied to the designs.
To accomplish these goals a set of three FPGA designs were selected: a LEON3 soft processor, a finite state machine called the ITC’99 B13 design, and a 128-bit AES encryption core. A
recent study [42] has proposed a set of reliability benchmark designs to assist in research related
to FPGA reliability. The B13 design is among the proposed set; but more importantly, this study
suggests that FPGA designs held in common can be used to better understand the impact of factors that affect reliability. By comparing the SEU sensitivity of FPGA designs with and without
SEU mitigation, on different FPGA architectures, or with variations in the test fixture used for
estimation, the influence of these factors on SEU sensitivity can be exposed and better understood.
The sections that follow describe the FPGA designs used in the experiments of this thesis.
General information is present about the design and its configuration for testing. Specifics are
given as to how the on-chip error detection test fixture is configured for the particular design,
and the kinds of reliability factors tested by each design are covered. The general idea is that
the SEU sensitivities of three FPGA designs are tested with different SEU mitigation techniques
applied, across two different FPGA architectures, with variations in the test fixtures used for SEU
sensitivity estimations. With the data that is collected: the benefits of SEU mitigation techniques
are demonstrated, a cross-architecture comparison is made of two FPGA architectures, and the best
means of protecting on-chip error detection circuity from SEUs studied.
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4.8.1

LEON3 Soft Processor
The LEON3 is an open-source 32-bit soft-core processor that is technology independent

and can be implemented on SRAM-based FPGAs. The processor is well documented and has a
strong user group for support [50]. For this work, only the core architecture of the LEON3 and
a minimal set of peripherals are included in the experiment. Caching is also disabled to facilitate
error detection. This configuration limits the scope of possible SEU failure modes. It also allows
the experiment to focus on the benefits of SEU mitigation and repair techniques, as observed in
fault injection and neutron radiation testing.
For the LEON3 experiments in this thesis, a one-to-one lockstep comparison scheme is
used for on-chip error detection. Two independent instances of the LEON3 processor are placed
on the same FPGA and compared against each other as they operate in lockstep. To provide a
relatively low-level of fault detection, 108 bus signals1 from each LEON3 processor are compared
on a clock-by-clock basis. Because caching is disabled, bus activity is elevated and better reflects
the functional state of the processor and connected peripherals. Rather than providing input vectors
to stimulate the design and keep it active for error propagation, each LEON3 processor executes
its own copy of the Dhrystone 2.1 benchmark in a continuous loop. The comparison and reduction
logic used for functional error detection has TMR applied to it to protect against SEUs in functional
error detection mechanism logic. The same testing fixture is used for all design variations.
Using on-chip error detection, the individual and combined benefits of complementary
SEU mitigation techniques are demonstrated. To accomplish this, five variations of SEU mitigation techniques are applied to the LEON3 design: configuration scrubbing, TMR, TMR with
configuration scrubbing, TMR with internal memory scrubbing of the ROM and RAM memory
modules, and TMR with both configuration and internal memory scrubbing. The SEU sensitivity
of each design variation is compared. The configuration scrubbing only variation is used as a baseline reference. The complementary nature of each SEU mitigation technique is observed as they
interact with each other. SEU sensitivity is evaluated on a Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA through fault
injection and radiation testing. Results suggest that combining complementary SEU mitigation
techniques offers the greatest reduction in SEU sensitivity.
1 To

processor – transfer done (1 bit), response type (2 bits), read data bus (32 bits); to peripherals – address bus
(32 bits), read/write (1 bit), transfer type (2 bits), transfer size (3 bits), burst type (3 bits), write data bus (32 bits).
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4.8.2

ITC’99 B13 Benchmark Design
The ITC’99 B13 Benchmarks is part of a suite of twenty-two benchmark designs that are

representative of typical circuits that can be synthesized [51]. This set of designs was proposed
for use as reliability benchmark designs by [42]. The B13 design is a finite state machine used to
control a weather station. Although the circuit is small, previous research has been conducted using
this design, which facilitates the comparison of mitigation approaches with other researchers [42].
Because the B13 design is smaller, 512 copies of the B13 are instanced on the target FPGA
to accelerate data collection. Having more instances on the FPGA increases the probability of
failure, which in turn increases the data collection rate for fault injection and radiation testing.
A one-to-many lockstep comparison scheme is combined with on-chip test vectors for the B13
experiments. Outputs of design instances are compared against each other and a set of golden test
vectors made available on the FPGA. The on-chip test control unit provides the input test vectors
to the B13 instances in a continuous loop and resets the instances between iterations. To mitigate
the effects of SEU in the input and output vectors, TMR and scrubbing are applied to the respective
memory modules.
Several variation of this design are tested on two different FPGA architectures. On a Xilinx
Kintex 7 FPGA, three SEU mitigation technique variations are tested: non-TMR, TMR, and TMR
with configuration scrubbing. The functional failure error detection logic is protected with TMR.
Results are compared against findings in related works and demonstrate the benefits of combining
complementary SEU mitigation techniques. On the Altera Stratix V FPGA, the SEU sensitivities of two SEU mitigation variations are estimated using two different functional error detection
mechanisms. It was found that a DWC protected functional error detection mechanism provided
more favorable results than a TMR protected error detection mechanism for error detection. Results from the non-TMR and TMR with configuration scrubbing variations are compared against
those of the Xilinx B13 experiments for a cross-architecture comparison.
A non-TMR version and a TMR version of a very simple FPGA design are also tested
using an on-chip one-to-many comparison scheme with on-chip test vectors. This experiment
was conducted on an Altera Stratix V FPGA and demonstrates that the amount of SEU reduction
observable using on-chip error detection may depend on the resource utilization ratio between the
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test fixture logic and the design under test. Fault injection results are compared against the B13
Altera fault injection results.

4.8.3

128-bit AES Cryptography Core
An open source 128-bit AES cryptography core is also used for testing. This is a larger

FPGA design that is representative of a real-world use case for FPGAs. The design is fully
pipelined and produces a valid output every clock cycle once the pipeline is filled.
The SEU sensitivity of this design was tested with on-chip error detection using a cascaded
one-to-one lockstep comparison scheme. Two instances of the AES design are chained together in
a feedback loop such that the output of one instance feeds into the input of the other. The outputs
of two chains are compared against each other. The test control unit fills the pipelines of both
chains with identical input vectors before feeding their outputs back into their respective inputs to
create a feedback loop. This approach fills the FPGA and keeps the design highly active, which
facilitates the detection of functional errors.
Like the B13 design, the SEU sensitivity of a non-TMR and a TMR with configuration
scrubbing variations of this design are tested across two FPGA architectures. A TMR variation
without configuration scrubbing is tested through fault injection on a Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA. Also
on the Kintex 7 FPGA, variations where the on-chip functional error detection mechanism is protected with TMR and DWC (first triplicated and then duplicated, such that a discrepancy must be
detected by the majority output of both triplicated mechanisms in order to be considered a failure)
are compared against results that just use DWC to protect the functional error detection mechanism
from SEUs. On the Altera Stratix V, non-TMR and TMR with configuration scrubbing results are
compared using DWC protected and TMR protected versions of the functional error detection
mechanism. Results suggest that using DWC alone for error detection is the best approach for
protecting functional error detection mechanisms from SEUs.

4.9

SEU Estimation Through Fault Injection and Radiation Testing
The design, comparison scheme, and functional error detection mechanism variations de-

scribed in Section 4.8 are tested through either fault injection, radiation testing, or both. In the
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chapters that follow, the approach and metrics used to collect data for fault injection and radiation testing are discussed. Collected data is also presented and compared with other results as
appropriate. Outcomes of the experiments as related to the original goals are discussed.
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CHAPTER 5.

FAULT INJECTION

Fault injection is the process of artificially introducing a fault and observing the response.
The type of fault injection referred to in this thesis involves mimicking the behavior of an SEU
in configuration memory by altering configuration memory. Fault injection can be used to estimate the SEU sensitivity of an FPGA design and to validate SEU mitigation techniques. While
it has limitations and does not replace the need for accelerated radiation testing, it does provide a
relatively inexpensive and rapid means of estimating SEU sensitivity and observing the potential
effects of SEUs [15].
There are many ways that fault injection can be done to emulate SEUs. In general, the
values stored in the SRAM-cells of the FPGA, which determine its configuration and the state
of the operating design, must be altered. One approach it to use partial reconfiguration. Partial
reconfiguration modifies the values stored in the SRAM-cells while the FPGA is active; the design
continues to run during this process. Using partial reconfiguration, an inverted bit value may be
written to the device. Partial reconfiguration can be done internally with fault injection logic on
the FPGA or can be done externally. Another method of performing fault injection is corrupting
the bitstream used to program the device by inverting a value of a bit within the bitstream.
In this chapter, the approach and metrics used for fault injection in the experiments of this
thesis are presented. Then results from all of the different experiments are presented. Appropriate
comparisons are made and some conclusions are drawn.

5.1

Approach
Several different fault injection campaigns can be used to gather data from fault injection.

The three main types are: exhaustive, targeted, and random. An exhaustive fault injection campaign injects a fault into every single configuration bit possible and tests each bit for sensitivity. A
targeted fault injection campaign is selective in the bits it injects and tests. Examples of targeted
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fault injection campaigns include only injecting faults into user flip-flops, or only injecting faults
into the essential or critical bits as reported by the CAD tools. Random fault injection has an
equal likelihood of upsetting any bit within the FPGA’s configuration memory. This campaign is
typically used to emulate radiation testing.
Fault injection tests consist of injecting faults and checking if a failure has occurred. To
emulate the behavior that would occur within a radiation test, a random fault injection campaign
was conducted to test all benchmark designs. This means that the configuration bits are selected
at random for fault insertion; much like the upsets that occur in a well constructed radiation test.
The primary goal of a fault injection experiment is to determine the sensitive CRAM bits within
the FPGA that cause the benchmark design to fail when upset. After a randomly selected CRAM
bit is upset, the behavior of the benchmark design is carefully monitored to see if any copy of the
benchmark design deviates from the behavior of the other copy or copies of the design that also
reside on the FPGA. If a deviation is detected, the CRAM bit is classified as sensitive; otherwise,
the CRAM bit is classified as non-sensitive. A large number of CRAM bits must be upset and
categorized to obtain sufficient statistical confidence.
Traditionally every configuration bit in a design would be tested; however, with newer
FPGA devices, exhaustive testing of configuration bits becomes less feasible. The experiments
conducted in this thesis all use a random fault injection campaign. This campaign follows the flow
shown in Figure 5.1. Injected faults and detected failures are recorded and used for analysis. This
test procedure follows the methodology of [52]. Since some of the variations of SEU mitigation
techniques tested by fault injection do not include CRAM scrubbing, an additional check is made
to see if CRAM scrubbing should be emulated. If scrubbing is enabled, the last injected fault is
repaired before injecting another fault. Otherwise, faults are allowed to accumulate, emulating
SEU behavior without CRAM scrubbing.
Compared to radiation testing, fault injection is relatively inexpensive and is able to collect
data at relatively high-speeds. Figure 5.2 displays a fault injection platform used for the experiments conducted on a Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA. This platform consists of a custom high-speed JTAG
configuration manager, which injects faults via partial reconfiguration over JTAG. This platform
can conveniently run in a local lab with little overhead. For the Altera FPGA designs, fault injec-

52

Full
Reconfiguration

Start

Inject Fault
into Random Bit
Repair
Injected Fault

Error
Propagation Delay

Yes
No

No

Emulate
Scrubbing?

Failure
Detected?

Yes

Figure 5.1: Fault Injection Flowchart

tion was performed using Altera’s fault injection debugger and IP core instances [53]. Once the
test is running, large amounts of data are collected without user intervention.
Only a portion of the configuration bits can be inverted via partial reconfiguration in Xilinx
FPGAs and fault injection in Altera FPGAs. BRAM data, global configuration bits, and other bits
on an active design can only be upset through radiation testing. Other SEEs, such as transient
currents, can only be caused by high-energy radiation. However, fault injection testing accelerates
radiation testing by granting insight into what to expect from radiation testing. Radiation tests are
expensive; fault injection allows users to better prepare their designs and test methodologies for
radiation testing.
Fault injection has its limitations and does not model all of the negative behavior of FPGAs
operating in the presence of ionizing radiation (e.g., upsets in the proprietary internal state of an
FPGA, user flip-flops, and block memories). Injected faults do not have the same characteristics
that may occur within a radiation test beam or in actual space orbit (i.e., multi-cell upsets and random inter arrival times). As such, some of the failure modes that are seen in radiation testing will
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Figure 5.2: A custom high-speed JTAG controller (left) is used to perform automated fault injection
testing on a Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA (right).
not appear in fault injection. Improvement in reliability, between the unmitigated and mitigated
design, seen by fault injection is expected to be higher than the improvement seen in radiation
testing. In spite of these limitations, fault injection is a very helpful tool that provides important, preliminary information on the effectiveness of a given mitigation scheme, or the influence of
FPGA architecture and test fixture configuration on SEU sensitivity.
The goals of fault injection for this work are: first, to estimate the configuration sensitivity
of several SEU mitigation approach on different benchmark designs; second, explore the influence
of protecting functional error detection logic with TMR and DWC; and finally, compare the SEU
sensitivities of several design variations on two different FPGA architectures.

5.2

Metrics
The primary metric used in the fault injection experiments is design sensitivity or the per-

centage of CRAM bits that cause a design failure when upset. This design sensitivity metric is very
similar to the design “cross section” metric that will be used for the neutron radiation test results.
Rather than testing each CRAM bit, the sensitivity of the design is estimated [54] by dividing the
number of observed failures (k) by the number of faults injected (n). This is equivalent to the
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maximum likelihood estimator, r̂, of the binomial distribution:
k
r̂ = .
n
A related metric is the Mean Upsets To failure (MUTF) or the inverse of the design sensitivity (i.e.,
n/k).
The standard deviation of the maximum likelihood estimator is used to determine the 95%
confidence interval between the sensitivity of the random sample and that of the design as a whole.
The standard deviation is estimated using the following equation:
s
σ=



k
k
1−
.
n2
n

(5.1)

The percent error is calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the maximum likelihood estimator. This value represents how tight the confidence interval is around the estimated sensitivity.
Designs with lower sensitivity (i.e., fewer faults) require much more fault injection to get good
results.
The Kintex 7 FPGA used in these experiments (XC7K325T) has approximately 25% fewer
CRAM bits than the Altera Stratix V FPGA (5SGXEA7) used in these experiments. To provide a
one-to-one comparison metric, the estimated number of sensitive bits in each design is used, with
corresponding 95% confidence intervals. This value is the product of the sensitivity of the design
and the total number of CRAM bits in the FPGA found in FPGA (72,823,424 for the Xilinx Kintex
7 FPGA; 98,681,196 for the Altera Stratix V FPGA). This metric helps assist in a fair comparison
of the two FPGAs.

5.3

LEON3 Xilinx Results
Five variations of SEU mitigation techniques, applied to the LEON3 processor, are tested:

configuration scrubbing, TMR, TMR with configuration scrubbing, TMR with internal memory
scrubbing of the RAM and ROM modules, and TMR with both configuration and internal memory
scrubbing. The estimated design sensitivity of each of the five LEON3 design variations is shown
in Table 5.1. This is the SEU sensitivity for all of the logic on the target FPGA, which includes two
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processors and the rest of the on-chip test fixture. Because the test fixture logic is also included in
the estimated sensitivity, the SEU sensitivity of a design can only be overestimated. The same is
true for the cross section of design obtained in neutron radiation testing. A rough SEU sensitivity
estimation of a single design instance be determined by dividing the total SEU sensitivity of the
test fixture and design instances by the number of design instances, two in this case.
Table 5.1: LEON3 Xilinx Fault Injection Results
Variation
Description
Faults Injected (n)
Observed Failures (k)
MUTF
Sensitivity
Percent Error
(95% Conf. Interval)
Est. Sensitive Bits
(95% Conf. Interval)
Improvement
(95% Conf. Interval)

1
CRAM Scrubbing
Baseline
1,831,859
6,501
282
.355%
1.24%
(.346%, .363%)
258,440
(252,168; 264,711)
1.00×
(.95×; 1.05×)

2
TMR No
Scrubbing
1,369,445
1,200
1,141
.0876%
2.89%
(.0827%, .0926%)
63,813
(60,204; 67,422)
4.05×
(3.74×; 4.4×)

3
TMR & BRAM
Scrubbing
1,502,340
1,100
1,366
.0732%
3.01%
(.0689%, .0775%)
53,321
(50,171; 56,471)
4.85×
(4.47×; 5.28×)

4
TMR & CRAM
Scrubbing
8,840,565
1,150
7,687
.0130%
2.95%
(.0123%, .0138%)
9,473
(8,926; 10,021)
27.28×
(25.17×; 29.66×)

5
TMR, BRAM &
CRAM Scrubbing
29,443,885
2,037
14,455
.00692%
2.22%
(.00662%, .00722%)
5,038
(4,819; 5,257)
51.30×
(47.97×; 54.93×)

The configuration scrubbing variation is the baseline reference LEON3 processor that provides no spatial SEU mitigation techniques. Without any additional internal mitigation hardware,
this design is the smallest of the different design variations and is expected to be the most sensitive
to SEUs. It is expected that this design will be the most sensitive to fault injection and ionizing radiation and that all other design variations will provide greater SEU immunity. Although no
structural mitigation was provided in this design, CRAM scrubbing was performed during the fault
injection and radiation testing. This scrubbing was performed to protect the comparison and reduction error detection logic used by the functional error detection mechanism of the test fixture1 .
All other design variations are compared to the SEU response of this baseline unmitigated design.
The improvement in design SEU sensitivity, over the baseline design, is also shown in Table 5.1. This is calculated by dividing the sensitivity of the baseline design by the sensitivity of the
design variation. All four LEON3 mitigated design variations demonstrate an improvement over
the unmitigated baseline design. The TMR only variation demonstrates a 4× improvement over
1 In

hindsight, it would have been interesting to include a non-TMR version without CRAM scrubbing in the
experiment.
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the baseline – its improvement is limited since it allows data corruption to accumulate within the
internal memories. Adding internal BRAM scrubbing (#3) further increases the improvement by
preventing BRAM error accumulation. Although errors are not artificially injected into the BRAM,
errors can enter the BRAM through errors in the surrounding logic. The use of CRAM scrubbing
is very important as it prevents the accumulation of upsets within the configuration memory and facilitates the proper operation of TMR. The combination of all SEU mitigation techniques provides
over 50× improvement in design sensitivity over the unmitigated baseline design.
These results, collected using an on-chip error detection approach, suggest that the mitigated LEON3 design is 51.3× less sensitive to upsets than the baseline design in spite of the
fact that the mitigated design is 3.4× larger in resource utilization over the unmitigated design.
These results indicate that the mitigation techniques described in Section 2.5 significantly reduce
the sensitivity of the LEON3 processor to upsets in the configuration memory.
In spite of applying SEU mitigation techniques, however, there are a number of configuration bits in the mitigated design that are still sensitive to single-event upsets. This suggests that
the design still contains a number of single points of failure, either in the test fixture logic, or in
the designs themselves. Future work will investigate the cause of these remaining single points of
failure to further improve the accuracy of on-chip error detection and the reliability of the design
under test.

5.4

B13 Altera Results
The B13 benchmark design was tested on an Altera Stratix V FPGA using two different

methods of protecting the on-chip functional error detection logic. The comparison and reduction
logic is either triplicated or duplicated. Triplicating the logic allows the correct answer to be voted
on but costs more area; duplication consumes fewer resources, but there is no way of telling which
redundant copy is correct when the two instances disagree with each other. The SEU sensitivity
of 512 instances of the B13 plus the on-chip test fixture logic is estimated using the two different
methods of protecting the on-chip functional error detection logic. Table 5.2 show the results from
testing an unmitigated and mitigated design variations using TMR protected error detection and
DWC protected error detection.

57

Table 5.2: B13 Altera Fault Injection Results
Description
Faults Injected (n)
Observed Failures (k)
MUTF
Sensitivity
Percent Error
(95% Conf. Interval)
Est. Sensitive Bits
(95% Conf. Interval)
Improvement
(95% Conf. Interval)

Unmitigated
TMR Detection
12,210
265
46
2.1704%
6.08%
(1.912%, 2.429%)
2,141,729
(1,886,675; 2,396,784)
1.00×
(.79×; 1.27×)

TMR & Scrubbing
TMR Detection
31,083
86
361
.2767%
10.77%
(.0827%, .0926%)
273,030
(215,404; 330,655)
7.84×
(5.71×; 11.13×)

Unmitigated
DWC Detection
19,493
285
68
1.462%
5.88%
(1.294%, 1.631%)
1,442,782
(50,171; 56,471)
1.00×
(.79×; 1.26×)

TMR & Scrubbing
DWC Detection
19,295
24
804
.1244%
20.40%
(.0747%, .1741%)
122,744
(8,926; 10,021)
11.75×
(7.43×; 21.84×)

The results suggest that protecting the functional error detection logic with DWC provides
more favorable results than using TMR to protect functional error detection logic for detecting
errors. The unmitigated design is more sensitive when tested using TMR protected error detection than when using DWC protected error detection. It is possible that the TMR protected error
detection logic returns more false positives than the DWC protected logic, thus increasing the sensitivity of the unmitigated and mitigated versions of the design. The overall improvement found
using TMR to protect the error detection logic is 7.84×; whereas using DWC to protect the error detection logic demonstrates an 11.75× improvement in reliability. Based on these results, it
appears that using DWC to protect error detection logic introduces fewer false-positives into the
results. The results provided by DWC are more favorable and may be more accurate, but without
some form of off-chip error validation (i.e., failure-immune validation) it cannot definitively be
said that DWC provides more accurate results than TMR for error detection.

5.4.1

Comparison of a Simple DUT and the B13
To study the impact of size of the test fixture logic verses size of the design under test, the

SEU sensitivity of a much smaller design under test was estimated using the same on-chip error
detection test fixture as the B13 design. TMR was used to protect the error detection logic for
this experiment. 2048 instances of simple design consisting of ten six-input look-up tables feeding
10 registers was tested. Random test vectors were used as input stimulus with corresponding
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golden output vectors. This design is considerably smaller than the B13 finite state machine.
This experiment is expected to demonstrate the negative influence of the test fixture overhead on
obtained results. Table 5.3 shows the results obtained through fault injection on an Altera Stratix
V FPGA.
Table 5.3: Simple DUT Altera Fault Injection Results
Description
Faults Injected (n)
Observed Failures (k)
MUTF
Sensitivity
Percent Error
(95% Conf. Interval)
Est. Sensitive Bits
(95% Conf. Interval)
Improvement
(95% Conf. Interval)

Unmitigated
TMR Detection
658
30
22
4.56%
17.84%
(2.97%, 6.15%)
4,499,143
(2,926,275; 6,072,010)
1.00×
(.48×; 2.07×)

TMR & Scrubbing
TMR Detection
11,345
100
113
.88 %
9.96%
(.71%, 1.05%)
869,821
(700,089; 1,039,553)
5.17×
(2.81×; 8.67×)

To provide a fair comparison between the B13 and the simple DUT designs, the results
from the simple DUT experiment are scaled so that the sensitivity of 512 instances of each design
are compared against each other instead of 2048 instances of the simple DUT against 512 of the
B13. This is done by multiplying the MUTF of the simple DUT by 4 and dividing its sensitivity
by 4. Table 5.4 shows a scaled comparison of the simple DUT and B13 fault injection data using
TMR protected functional error detection logic.
The results obtained from on-chip error detection find that a simple DUT instance is less
sensitive than a B13 instance for both the unmitigated and mitigated versions respectively. This
is determined by comparing the scaled sensitivity of both designs and noting that in both the
unmitigated and mitigated cases the sensitivity is lower for the simple DUT design. Considering
that the simple DUT design is much smaller than the B13 design, this outcome is to be expected.
The more interesting outcome is found by comparing the improvement between the unmitigated
and mitigated version of each design. The simple DUT design shows an improvement of 5.17x
whereas the B13 design shows an improvement of 7.84x (using TMR protected error detection
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Table 5.4: Normalized Simple DUT and B13 Comparison Fault Injection Results

Description
MUTF
Sensitivity
Percent Error
Est. Sensitive Bits
Improvement

Simple DUT
Unmitigated
88
1.140%
17.84%
1,124,786
1.00×

Simple DUT
TMR & Scrubbing
452
.2204%
9.96%
217,455
5.17×

B13
Unmitigated
46
2.1704%
6.08%
2,141,729
1.00×

B13
TMR & Scrubbing
361
.2767%
10.77%
273,030
7.84×

logic). These results suggest that as the sensitivity of a design decreases in relation to the test
fixture logic overhead, the amount of improvement that can be demonstrated declines. In other
words, there is a shared likelihood of false positives occurring from SEUs in the test fixture logic;
as the sensitivity of the design decreases, the likelihood of false-positives begins to dominate,
which makes it harder to see a difference between the sensitivity of the unmitigated and mitigated
version of a design.
The error bounds in this experiment overlap in part because the improvement between the
two designs are close together. The fact that the improvement from SEU mitigation is close in
both designs suggests that the overhead of false-positive occurrences is significant. In other words,
a significant portion of the estimated sensitivity in this experiment is due to SEUs in the error
detection logic that resulted in false-positive failure reports. Further experimentation and off-chip
error validation would strengthen these conclusions.

5.5

B13 Xilinx Results
On a Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA, 512 instances of the B13 design were compared against each

other and a set of golden output vectors using TMR protected functional error detection logic.
Three variations of SEU mitigation were applied to the designs for testing. The “Unmitigated”
version does not have TMR applied to the B13 design instances, but it does have configuration
scrubbing applied to the prevent SEU accumulation in the on-chip error detection test fixture logic.
Again, this version is expected to be the most sensitive version and is use as a baseline reference
for the other variations of the design. In the second version, only TMR is applied to the design.
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The third version combines TMR and configuration scrubbing. Fault injection was performed on
this design to demonstrate the benefits of combining TMR and scrubbing, show what happens to
TMR benefits with SEU accumulation (i.e., without configuration scrubbing), and to later be used
in a cross-architecture comparison of SEU sensitivity on an Altera Stratix V FPGA and a Xilinx
Kintex-7 FPGA. Result from the random fault injection campaign are shown in Figure 5.5.
Table 5.5: B13 Xilinx Fault Injection Results
Description
Faults Injected (n)
Observed Failures (k)
MUTF
Sensitivity
Percent Error
(95% Conf. Interval)
Est. Sensitive Bits
(95% Conf. Interval)
Improvement
(95% Conf. Interval)

Unmitigated
558,012
8,600
65
1.54%
1.07%
(1.51%,1.57%)
1,122,344
(1,098,807; 1,145,882)
1.0×
(.96×; 1.04×)

TMR Only
665,461
2,791
235
0.45%
1.89%
(.41%, .44%)
310,087
(298,608; 321,567)
3.62×
(3.42×; 3.84×)

TMR & Scrubbing
58,237,618
8,533
6,825
.0147%
1.08%
(.0143%,.0150%)
10,670
(10,444; 10,897)
105.2×
(100.84×; 109.72×)

Results in Table 5.5 demonstrate a 105.2× improvement in reliability between the unmitigated and the TMR with configuration scrubbing design. TMR alone only demonstrates a 3.6×
reduction in SEU sensitivity. Without configuration scrubbing, the benefits of TMR drastically
decline. It is interesting to note that a number of sensitive bits (i.e., bits that if upset will cause
the design to fail), are still present in the design. Future work will investigate why these bits are
sensitive and how to eliminate them.

5.6

AES Altera Results
Much like the fault injection test of the B13 design on an Altera Stratix V FPGA, the

AES fault injection experiments on the Altera Stratix V FPGA compares two different approaches
for protection of functional error detection logic. The first approach protects the detection with
logic with TMR, but the triplicated clock network was optimized away by the CAD tools into a
single clock network. The second approach uses DWC to protect the error detection logic, and the
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clock network was forced to be triplicated. This experiment compares the effects of using TMR
over DWC for protecting error detection logic, and demonstrates the importance of triplicating the
clock network for TMR. Results from this experiment are shown in Figure 5.6.
Table 5.6: AES Altera Fault Injection Results
Description
Faults Injected (n)
Observed Failures (k)
MUTF
Sensitivity
Percent Error
(95% Conf. Interval)
Est. Sensitive Bits
(95% Conf. Interval)
Improvement
(95% Conf. Interval)

Unmitigated
TMR Detection
Single Clock
3,903
400
10
10.249%
4.47%
(9.297%, 11.200%)
10,113,369
(9,174,418; 11,052,319)
1.00×
(.83×; 1.20×)

TMR & Scrubbing
TMR Detection
Single Clock
3,987
177
23
4.439%
7.35%
(3.800%, 5.079%)
4,380,881
(3,749,967; 5,011,795)
2.31×
(1.83×; 2.95×)

Unmitigated
DWC Detection
Triplicated Clock
14,544
1,451
10
9.977%
2.49%
(9.490%, 10.463%)
9,845,051
(9,364,413; 10,325,688)
1.00×
(.91×; 1.10×)

TMR & Scrubbing
DWC Detection
Triplicated Clock
124,045
17
7,297
.0137%
24.25%
(.0072%, .0202%)
13,524
(7,096;19,952)
727.97×
(469.34×; 1,455.24×)

It is interesting to note that in this design there is not much difference between the sensitivity of the unmitigated design estimated by TMR protected error detection logic with a single
clock and estimated by DWC protected logic with a triplicated clock. Both approaches returned a
MUTF of approximately 10. For the B13 design, 512 sets of 10-bit signals are compared against
each other and a set of golden inputs and the result is reduced to a single bit. That requires a 51,210
input reduction tree network. In the AES design, the functional error detection logic compares two
sets of 128-bit signals, which requires only a 256 input reduction tree network. The reduction
tree network needed by the AES design is much smaller than that of the B13 design, and thus the
prevalence of false-positive failures is lessened [33]. Based on these considerations and the fact
that each AES instance has much higher resource utilization than the on-chip error detection test
fixture, it is assumed that false-positive overhead in the results of the AES design is very small.
By triplicating the clock network and using DWC to protect the error detection logic from
reporting false-positives, the improvement benefit gained from applying TMR and configuration
scrubbing increased from 2.31× to 728×. This is an enormous leap in improvement. These results
suggest that by triplicating the clock networks, many single point failures are eliminated in the
triplicated AES design logic. Using DWC over TMR to protect the functional error detection logic
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contributed to this improvement increase in the results; although, it is difficult to say by how much.
The most important outcome from this comparison is that triplicating the clock network reduces
single point failures in the design, and that DWC protection of functional error detection logic
provides more favorable results.
Much greater improvement is seen in the AES design than in the B13 design when TMR
and configuration scrubbing are applied to the designs. There are many factors that influence the
SEU sensitivity of a design including: synthesis, placement, and routing. One possible cause of the
difference is the number of times all three TMR domains are forced to pass through the same logic
function. In the B13 design, there are approximately 87,000 majority voters in the final on-chip
test fixture circuit with the TMR’d design instances. In the AES design, there are approximately
768 majority voters in the final on-chip test fixture circuit with the TMR’d design instances. Each
majority voter is a logic function that all three TMR domains must pass through, which presents
a potential vulnerability for single points failures [32]. These results suggest that there are more
single point failures in the mitigated B13 design than there are in the mitigated AES design on this
particular FPGA architecture.

5.7

AES Xilinx Results
Like the B13 design on an Altera Stratix V FPGA, the AES design is tested on a Xilinx

Kintex 7 FPGA using two variations of SEU mitigation for the on-chip functional error detection logic. The first variation is an aggressive form of SEU mitigation that consists of both TMR
and DWC. In this variation, the functional error detection logic is first triplicated and then duplicated. Figure 5.3 depicts a TMR and DWC protected error detection logic. The outputs of design
instances A and B are fed through a comparison and reduction network that is triplicated and duplicated. An error is only detected when two or more of the majority voter outputs (C0 , C1 , C2 ; and
D0 , D1 , D2 respectively) of both copies of the triplicated comparison and reduction network agree
that an error has occurred, at the same time. The second variation is a DWC protected functional
error detection logic.
The original intent was that using an aggressive SEU mitigation of the functional error
detection logic would reduce the likelihood of false-positives and improve the accuracy of on-chip
error detection. This seemed plausible since the encoding of errors is stronger with this approach
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Figure 5.3: TMR and DWC Protected Function Error Detection Mechanism

(i.e., errors have to be detected by two triplicated functional error detection circuits). The estimated
SEU sensitivity of the unmitigated and mitigated version of the AES design are shown in Table 5.7
and compared with findings gathered using DWC protected error detection logic.
Table 5.7: AES Xilinx Fault Injection Results

Faults Injected (n)
Observed Failures (k)
MUTF
Sensitivity
Percent Error
(95% Conf. Interval)
Est. Sensitive Bits
(95% Conf. Interval)

Unmitigated
TMR/DWC Detection
832,113
10,000
83
1.20%
.99%
(1.18%, 1.22%)
874,619
(857,580; 891,658)

TMR & Scrubbing
TMR/DWC Detection
1,493,221
1,779
839
.119%
2.37%
(.114%, .125%)
86,707
(82,680; 90,734)

Improvement
(95% Conf. Interval)

1.00×
(.96×; 1.04×)

10.09×
(9.45×; 10.78×)

Description

Unmitigated
DWC Detection
278,287
19,233
14
6.9%
.70%
(6.8%, 7.0%)
5,032,980
(4,964,351;
5,101,609)
1.00×
(.97×; 1.03×)

TMR
DWC Detection
974,499
23,971
41
2.46%
.64%
(2.43%, 2.49%)
1,791,331
(1,768,935;
1,813,728)
2.8×
(2.7×; 2.9×)

TMR & Scrubbing
DWC Detection
5,312,513
5,024
1,057
.095%
1.41%
(.092%, .097%)
68,869
(66,965; 70,772)
73.1×
(70.2×; 76.2×)

The data only demonstrates a 10× improvement between the unmitigated and mitigated
design versions using TMR and DWC to protect the functional error detection logic; whereas the
DWC protected functional error detection logic demonstrates a 73× reduction in SEU sensitivity
between the unmitigated and mitigated design versions. An interesting thing to note is that the
sensitivity of the unmitigated design reported using the TMR and DWC error detection protection
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is much lower than that of the unmitigated version as reported by DWC protected error detection
logic. It is not clear what causes these differences. It is possible that TMR and DWC protected logic
misses error events (i.e., false-negatives) or better masks errors in the functional error detection
logic, but without off-chip error validation, it is difficult to confirm.
The DWC protected functional error detection circuitry results are more in line with the
Xilinx Kintex 7 results on the LEON3 and B13 circuit, and they are more favorable than the
results obtained from the TMR and DWC protected error detection circuitry. For these reasons,
the DWC protected results will be used for comparison with Altera Stratix V results. It is also a
fitting comparison because the Altera Stratix V test also uses DWC to protect the functional error
detection circuitry of its experiment.
Another interesting outcome of the AES experiments on the Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA are
the results of the TMR only version of the AES design using DWC protected error detection (see
Table 5.7). Like the B13 TMR only design, much less improvement is gained by applying TMR
alone than by applying TMR with configuration scrubbing. TMR alone demonstrates a 2.8× improvement; whereas TMR with configuration scrubbing demonstrates a 73× improvement over
the baseline unmitigated version. This is the type of behavior that can be expected when SEUs are
allowed to accumulate or occur faster than the scrubbing method can keep up with.

5.8

Comparison of Fault Injection Results on Two FPGA Architectures
Data from these experiments can be used to compare the SEU sensitivity of designs im-

plemented on an Altera Stratix V (5SGXEA7)FPGA and a Xilinx Kintex 7 (XC7K325T)FPGA.
These devices offer similar feature sets and are both built on 28nm process technology. Table 5.8
summarizes the fault injection results of the B13 and AES designs across both FPGA architectures.
Fault injection results demonstrate some surprising similarities between the two FPGA
architectures. First, unmitigated versions of the tested designs have nearly the same number of
estimated sensitive bits. Estimated sensitive bits are proportionally scaled to the number of CRAM
bits on the device, which provides a metric for a one-to-one comparison of fault injection results
across FPGA architectures. The B13 design has 1.4 million and 1.1 million estimated sensitive
bits on the Stratix V and Kintex 7 respectively. Estimates are within 2× of each other for the AES
design. Considering all of the variables involved, it is impressive that two FPGA architectures with
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Table 5.8: Comparison of Fault Injection Data
Design
Description
Altera Stratix V

Xilinx Kintex 7

Percent Error
MUTF
Est. Sensitive Bits
Improvement
Percent Error
MUTF
Est. Sensitive Bits
Improvement

ITC’99 Benchmark B13
Unmitigated Mitigated
5.88%
20.40%
68
804
1,442,782
122,744
1.00×
11.75×
1.07%
.015%
65
6,825
1,122,344
10,670
1.00×
105.2×

128-bit AES IP Core
Unmitigated Mitigated
2.49%
24.25%
10
7,297
9,845,051
13,524
1.00×
728×
0.70%
1.41%
14
1,057
5,032,980
68,869
1.00×
73.1×

separate CAD tools for synthesis, placement, and routing would implement FPGA designs with
comparable SEU sensitivity. Second, with TMR and scrubbing applied to the designs, each FPGA
architecture favored one design over the other for reduction of SEU sensitivity. Significantly better
improvement and fewer estimated sensitive bits were found for the AES design on the Stratix V
and for the B13 design on the Kintex 7 FPGA. This suggests that benefits from SEU mitigation are
design and architecture dependent.
TMR and configuration scrubbing reduced SEU sensitivity in all cases. On the Altera
Stratix V, the B13 design demonstrated an approximate 12× reduction in sensitivity and the AES
design demonstrated an approximate 728× reduction in sensitivity. The Kintex 7 demonstrated
a 117× and a 73× approximate sensitivity reduction for the B13 and AES designs respectively.
There are still a number of estimated sensitive bits for each mitigated design and device suggesting
that further improvement can be made in the mitigation approach.
Fault injection is relatively inexpensive and can be conducted very quickly in comparison to
accelerated radiation beam testing, but fault injection is not a replacement for radiation testing [15].
Fault injection was used in these experiments to gather preliminary data and to prepare experiments
for radiation testing. While fault injection provides useful information, radiation testing provides
more accurate results and is the commonly accepted standard for estimating design sensitivity
to SEUs [15]. The test fixtures that demonstrated the most favorable results are further tested
with radiation testing. Where comparison was possible, using DWC to protect functional error
detection logic provided the most favorable results and is thus selected for radiation testing over
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TMR protected functional error detection logic where possible. The LEON3 and B13 design on a
Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA are the only design in radiation testing that use TMR protected functional
error detection logic, all the others use DWC. In the next chapter, the approach and metrics used
for neutron radiation testing as well as obtained results are discussed.
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CHAPTER 6.

RADIATION TESTING

Although more expensive and difficult to conduct, radiation testing provides a more accurate estimate of the sensitivity of the design to SEUs. This is because, unlike fault injection,
radiation testing upsets all of the internal memory of the FPGA including BRAM and other user
memories. SETs are also observed in radiation testing whereas they do not occur in fault injection [55]. To provide a more complete study, some of the design variation tested through fault
injection are also tested with an accelerated neutron radiation beam. Priority is given to the best
performing on-chip test fixtures, and the results are analyzed.
Neutron radiation testing was conducted at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) in November of 2015 and December of 2016 for the experiments included in this thesis1 .
This facility provides a wide spectrum spallation neutron beam source, which is commonly used to
measure and report terrestrial neutron soft-errors in semiconductor devices [4]. All five variations
of the LEON3 design and the three variations of the B13 were tested to demonstrate the individual
and combined benefits of SEU mitigation techniques. The LEON3 data is compared against fault
injection data and the B13 data is compared against findings in [42]. The B13 data is also used in
a comparison of SEU sensitivities of designs implemented on different FPGA architectures. The
B13 and AES designs are tested on an Altera Stratix V and a Xilinx Kintex 7 for comparison.

6.1

Approach
The neutron radiation experiments were conducted by exposing an active FPGA design to

an accelerated neutron radiation beam; the total number of observed failures and the total amount
of exposure are recorded for analysis. The development boards that the FPGA designs operate
on are mounted normal to a two inch collimated neutron beam. Figure 6.1 shows the board setup
used in the December 2016 test. The distance from the neutron source to the FPGA is carefully
1 LANCSE

graciously provided neutron beam time under proposal NS-2016-7268-F. Much gratitude is extended
for access to the beam.
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measured and compensated for in analysis. Three Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGAs and one Altera Stratix
V FPGA were used in the December 2016 test, and three Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGAs were used in the
November 2015 test.

Altera Stratix V
Xilinx Kintex 7

Neutron Beam Path
Figure 6.1: Neutron Beam Test Setup

Throughout the duration of a beam test, several test runs are conducted to collect data. A
test run begins by first configuring the FPGAs with the design under test. Each design becomes
active as soon as it is loaded and does not require any external stimulus (i.e. from outside of
the FPGA) to remain active. The beam shutter is then opened. Whenever a functional failure
is observed, it is recorded and the FPGA is reconfigured with the design under test. All of the
configuration upsets that occur, as reported by configuration scrubbing, are also recorded. A test
run ends with the closing of the beam shutter. Automating these tests is important because of the
amount of time it takes to collect statistically significant amounts of data. Multiple beam runs are
performed as needed to collect sufficient data to make good cross section estimates. A beam run
consists of opening the beam shutter, observing failure events, and closing the beam shutter (see
Appendix B).
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6.2

Metrics
The main metric used to estimate the SEU sensitivity of a design in neutron radiation testing

is the cross section. The cross section of a design is a hypothetical area that if a particle passes
through, would result in an event, in this case a functional failure event [19]. A larger cross
section signifies the design is more sensitive. The neutron cross section is estimated by dividing
the number of errors observed in the test by the total fluence (neutrons per square centimeter,

n
)
cm2

of the radiation beam,
σ=

Nerrors
Fluence

(6.1)

and has units of cm2 . The design cross section measures the cross section of the entire FPGA
device running one of the design variations under test, which includes the test fixture and any
instances of the design. The cross section captures all failure mechanisms of the design including
CRAM upsets, BRAM upsets, upsets into hidden FPGA state, and SEFIs. This cross section
measurement will be used to compare all five LEON3 design variations against each other and
facilitate the comparison of the neutron radiation tests against the fault injection tests (see Section
6.3). It is also used in the other comparisons made in this chapter. The 95% confidence interval is
approximated using the standard deviation of the Normal distribution,
√
1.96 ∗ Observed Failures
.
Total Fluence
Because the sensitive cross section of a design does not depend on the total number of CRAM
bits contained in the FPGA, the design cross section can be used as a one-to-one comparison
metric across architectures. The improvement shown is a ratio between the cross section of the
unmitigated and the mitigated design.
To facilitate the comparison of results obtained during fault injection tests against results
obtained during radiation testing, the number of “sensitive bits” is estimated for each of the design
variations tested through neutron radiation. The number of “sensitive bits” is estimated by dividing
the neutron cross section of the full design by the cross section of a single CRAM bit. The neutron
cross section of a CRAM bit for a Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA was previously measured at LANSCE
at 6.99×10−15 [56]. For the Altera Stratix V FPGA, the cross section of a single CRAM bit is
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estimated using upset data from the experiments in this thesis (See Section 6.5.1). The estimated
number of sensitive bits for each design variation is included in the results.
This approach for estimating the number of sensitive bits is pessimistic and will overestimate the actual number of sensitive bits in a design. Any mechanism that causes the LEON3
processor to fail will be attributed to CRAM upsets. Such failure mechanisms may include upsets with BRAM bits, user Flip-Flops, SETs, and upsets within the hidden state of the FPGA.
This estimate will manifest these types of failures as “sensitive CRAM bits” rather than their true
failure mechanism. In spite of this limitation, this estimate is still useful in that it facilitates the
comparison of sensitive bits estimated from both fault injection and radiation testing.

6.3

LEON3 Xilinx Results
The results from the neutron radiation test are shown in Table 6.1. The estimated cross

section for each design variation is shown, including the number of failures observed, and the total
fluence. The percent error is the standard deviation divided by the cross section and represents
how tight the confidence interval is. Because of the limited neutron radiation test time, it was
difficult to obtain sufficient testing statistics for all five design variations. In particular, the “TMR
No Scrubbing” (#2) and the “TMR and CRAM Scrubbing” (#4) design variations have very wide
confidence intervals.
Table 6.1: Neutron Radiation Data
Variation

1
Unmitigated

2
TMR No
Scrubbing

3
TMR & BRAM
Scrubbing

4
TMR & CRAM
Scrubbing

5
TMR, BRAM &
CRAM Scrubbing

Est. Sensitive Bits
(95% Conf. Interval)

35
1.34 × 1010
2.61 × 10−9
33.13%
(1.74 × 10−9 ,
3.47 × 10−9 )
380,822
(249,462; 496,648)

5
1.56 × 1010
3.20 × 10−10
87.65%
(3.95 × 10−11 ,
6.00 × 10−10 )
46,691
(5,647; 85,825)

17
1.06 × 1011
1.60 × 10−10
47.54%
(8.41 × 10−11 ,
2.36 × 10−10 )
23,345
(12,028; 33,826)

9
9.30 × 1010
9.68 × 10−11
65.33%
(3.36 × 10−11 ,
1.60 × 10−10 )
14,124
(4,801; 22,896)

11
2.06 × 1011
5.34 × 10−11
59.10%
(2.18 × 10−11 ,
8.49 × 10−11 )
7,792
(3,124; 12,149)

Improvement
(95% Conf. Interval)

1.00×
(.5×; 1.99×)

8.16×
(2.91×; 87.96×)

16.27×
(7.37×; 41.29×)

26.94×
(10.9×; 103.45×)

48.85×
(20.53×; 159×)

Description
Failures
Fluence (n/cm2 )
Cross Section (cm2 )
Percent Error
(95% Conf. Interval)
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The estimate of the design cross section for each of the four LEON3 design variations is
less than the estimated design cross section of the baseline unmitigated design suggesting that these
mitigation approaches are successful. The use of successive SEU mitigation techniques provides
a correspondingly lower design cross section, with the lowest design cross section obtained from
design variation #5, which includes TMR, BRAM scrubbing of the ROM and RAM modules, and
CRAM scrubbing. This combination of techniques reduced the estimated design cross section by
49×.
The results during radiation testing summarized in Table 6.1 are an improvement over the
results obtained during a similar experiment [57]. In this previous experiment, the improvement
in SEU sensitivity using all three mitigation techniques was only 10× in spite of fault injection
results suggesting 51× improvement. The disparity between radiation testing and neutron testing
suggested problems with the experimental setup. After thorough investigation, it was found that the
CRAM scrubber was only scrubbing one third of the Kintex-7 325T FPGA. The CRAM scrubbing
issue was resolved for these experiments and the fault injection and radiation testing are much
closer in alignment.

Comparison to Fault Injection Results
Using the same five designs in a similar testing strategy facilitates comparison of the results
between the fault injection experiments and the radiation testing experiments. Table 6.2 summarizes the key results from both sets of experiments for all five LEON3 design variations to facilitate
side-by-side comparison (the results are copied from Tables 5.1 and 6.1). Before comparing the
specific results from these tests it is important to note that the confidence intervals of the radiation
test results are much larger than the confidence intervals of fault injection (as noted by the “percent
error”). This disparity is due to the limited time available for radiation testing and slow rate of
upsets obtained in radiation testing in comparison to fault injection.
The first method for comparing the two testing methods is to compare the “Improvement”
of each of the SEU mitigation techniques. The improvement results indicate how much each design
variation reduced the SEU sensitivity over the baseline unmitigated design. The improvement
facilitates the relative benefit of each mitigation techniques for both fault injection and radiation
testing. All SEU mitigation techniques provide improvement and the improvement increases as the
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Table 6.2: Comparison of Fault Injection and Neutron Radiation Testing
Variation

1
Unmitigated

Description
Fault Injection

Neutron Radiation

Percent Error
Est. Sensitive Bits
Improvement
Percent Error
Est. Sensitive Bits
Improvement

1.24%
258,440
1.00×
33.13%
380,822
1.00×

2
TMR No
Scrubbing
2.89%
63,813
4.05×
87.65%
46,691
8.16×

3
TMR & BRAM
Scrubbing
3.01%
53,321
4.85×
47.54%
23,345
16.27×

4
TMR & CRAM
Scrubbing
2.95%
9,473
27.28×
65.33%
14,124
26.94×

5
TMR, BRAM &
CRAM Scrubbing
2.22%
5,038
51.30×
59.10%
7,792
48.85×

mitigation techniques are combined. In spite of the differences in the testing methodologies, the
improvement for fault injection and radiation testing is surprisingly similar for most of the design
variations (#1, #4, and #5). When all techniques are combined, design variation #5 has the highest
improvement of roughly 50× for both fault injection and radiation testing. The improvement
observed in both testing methodologies is plotted in Figure 6.2 including the confidence interval
bounds.
TMR only on the unmitigated design (#2) demonstrated an improvement in reliability of
8.16× in radiation testing and 4.05× in fault injection. The greater improvement seen in radiation
testing is likely due to the fact that radiation testing upsets more system state than fault injection
(such as BRAM and user flip-flops) and TMR protects these additional failure mechanisms that are
not tested with fault injection. This effect is more pronounced in the TMR and BRAM scrubbing
variation (#3) in which radiation testing demonstrates a 16× improvement while the improvement
for fault injection is only 4.9×. This suggests that internal BRAM memory scrubbing plays a
significant component in improving the SEU sensitivity of FPGA systems that employ internal
BRAM memory.
Configuration scrubbing plays a very important part in reducing SEU design sensitivity as
suggested by design variations #4 and #5 that integrate active CRAM scrubbing. This suggests
there is a greater chance of failure due to SEU accumulations in configuration memory than due to
SEU accumulations in BRAM for this design, or in other words that the majority of bits utilized by
the LEON3 design are part of static configuration memory. This would explain why configuration
scrubbing has a greater positive impact on the reliability of the TMR design than internal memory
scrubbing.
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Fault Injection
60x

Neutron Radiation
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8.16x

1.00x

4.85x

4.05x

0x
Variation 1

Variation 2

Variation 3

Variation 4

Variation 5

Figure 6.2: SEU Sensitivity Improvement for Each Design Variation

Another method for comparing the results between fault injection and radiation testing is to
compare the estimated sensitive bits for each design variation. This approach facilitates absolute
comparison of SEU sensitivity between fault injection and radiation testing. The number of sensitive bits is estimated for fault injection by multiplying the estimated design sensitivity by the total
number of configuration bits; this number is estimated in radiation testing by dividing the design
sensitive cross section by the cross section of a single configuration bit. The estimated number of
sensitive bits for all design variations in both testing approaches is summarized in Table 6.2 along
with the 95% confidence bounds.
For the unmitigated design (#1), radiation testing estimates a significantly higher number
of sensitive bits than with fault injection. This result is expected since more internal state is upset
during radiation testing than fault injection (BRAM, FFs, SETs, etc.). These data support the
idea that BRAMs are excluded from testing in fault injection but included in radiation testing.
These data also show the design as slightly more susceptible failure in the beam than in fault
injection which is to be expected. This trend of higher estimated sensitive bits also is seen in
design variations #4 and #5 as well2 .
2 The

estimated number of sensitive bits for designs #2 and #3 is lower for radiation testing than for fault injection.
For reasons that are not fully understood, CRAM scrubbing has a greater effect during radiation testing than fault
injection.
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6.4

B13 Xilinx Results
Three variations of the B13 design were tested through radiation testing: configuration

scrubbing, TMR, and TMR with configuration scrubbing. Like the LEON3 experiment, this experiment also shows in the individual and combined benefits of SEU mitigation techniques. One
difference between the two experiments is that the B13 experiment uses a one-to-many lockstep
on-chip functional error detection logic with on-chip golden test vectors whereas the LEON3 experiment uses a one-to-one lockstep comparison logic. The difference in SEU sensitivity between
the SEU mitigation techniques can be seen using both methods. The results from neutron radiation
testing are presented in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: B13 Neutron Radiation Results
Unmitigated
Failures
Fluence (n/cm2 )
Fluence To Failure
Cross Section (cm2 )
(confidence int.)
Improvement

120
1.30E+10
1.08E+08
9.26E-9

Mitigated
W/O Scrubbing
108
6.01E+10
5.56E+08
1.80E-9

Mitigated
W/ Scrubbing
26
1.47E+11
5.66E+09
1.77E-10

(7.6E-9,1.1E-8)

(1.5E-9,2.1E-9)

(1.1E-10,2.5E-10)

1.0

5.1

52.4

It is not surprising that the benefits of TMR without scrubbing are significantly less than
TMR with scrubbing as analytical models suggest that TMR without repair (scrubbing in this case)
5
v.s λ1 ). The fact that TMR without scrubbing
has a lower MTTF than single, non-TMR systems ( 6λ

exhibits an improvement over the non-TMR system is most likely due to the fact that fine-grain
feedback TMR is used rather than coarse-grain TMR with a single set of global output voters.
More curious still is that the improvement in reliability for the TMR design without scrubbing is
higher than what was observed in fault injection of 3.6× (See Table 5.5). The 95% confidence error
bounds overlap between these two measurements, but it is possible that the improvement seen in
neutron radiation is slightly skewed towards greater improvement because of the time it takes to
reprogram the device during radiation exposure.
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6.4.1

Comparison to Other Mitigation Techniques
Using the B13 neutron test results from [42], neutron cross sections for each version were

calculated. The provided FITs were converted to cross sections using the fast neutron flux for New
York City (13 neutrons/cm2 /hour). In the X-TMR/VERI-Place experiment 30 redundant copies
of the B13 circuit were placed in each implementation. This experiment contains 512 redundant
copies of the B13 circuit per implementation. For comparison between the two experiments (this
experiment and [42]) cross-section data from both experiments were adjusted to represent the cross
section of a single B13 circuit.
Table 6.4: Neutron Cross Section Comparison of Mitigation Techniques
Implementation

Cross Section (cm2 )

Improvement

Overhead

Unmitigated [42]
X-TMR [42]
VERI-Place [42]

5.38E-9±7.69E-11
4.41E-9±2.56E-11
3.44E-10±1.03E-11

1.00×
1.22×
15.67×

1.00×
4.56×
4.56×

Unmitigated
TMR w/o Scrubbing
TMR w/ Scrubbing

1.81E-11±3.30E-12
3.51E-12±6.75E-13
3.45E-13±1.35E-13

1.00×
5.15×
52.41×

1.00×
4.23×
4.23×

The single B13 designs cross section, normalized improvement in reliability and the overhead cost of the applied mitigation techniques are shown in Table 6.4. The normalized improvement in reliability is how many times smaller the cross section of the mitigated design is compared
to the corresponding unmitigated design. It is interesting to note that the cross section of the unmitigated design in the X-TMR/VERI-Place experiment is much larger than that of the unmitigated
design tested in this experiment.
The X-TMR/VERI-Place experiment was conducted on a Virtex-5LX50T Xilinx SRAMbased FPGA [42]. The neutron cross sections of a single CRAM bit in that FPGA compared to the
Kintex 7 325T used in this experiment are fairly close together. It is not clear what is causing the
difference in cross section of the unmitigated designs from each experiment.
X-TMR showed a relative improvement in reliability of 1.22× whereas the BL-TMR design demonstrated a 5.15× improvement in reliability. This is most likely due to the fine-grain
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feedback TMR approach. Applying VERI-Place to X-TMR design demonstrated a 12.84× improvement in reliability [58]. Applying configuration scrubbing to the BL-TMR improved the
designs reliability by an order of magnitude.

6.5

B13 and AES on Two Different FPGA Architectures
The total neutron fluence exposure of each design and the number of observed failures is

reported in Table 6.5. As in fault injection, the two FPGAs are shown to be comparable for SEU
sensitivity. The cross section of the B13 unmitigated design was very similar between the Stratix V
and Kintex 7 FPGA. The same is true for the AES unmitigated design. As with fault injection, the
mitigated version of each design demonstrates a greater improvement and a smaller sensitive cross
section in opposite FPGAs. The AES design preferred the Stratix V FPGA and the B13 design
preferred the Kintex 7 FPGA. TMR and scrubbing reduced the cross section of each design by a
factor of 4× to 54×.
Table 6.5: Neutron Radiation Results
Design
Description

Altera
Stratix V

Total Fluence
Observed Failures
Cross Section (cm2 )
(95% Conf. Interval)
Improvement
(95% Conf. Interval)

Xilinx
Kintex 7

Total Fluence
Observed Failures
Cross Section (cm2 )
(95% Conf. Interval)
Improvement
(95% Conf. Interval)

ITC’99 Benchmark B13
Unmitigated
Mitigated

128-bit AES IP Core
Unmitigated
Mitigated

6.24×1010
661
1.06 × 10−8
(9.79×10−9 ;
1.14×10−8 )
1.00×
(0.86×; 1.17×)

1.06×1011
102
9.62 × 10−10
(7.75×10−10 ;
1.15×10−9 )
11.02×
(8.53×; 14.72×)

7.88×109
365
4.63 × 10−8
(4.16×10−8 ;
5.11×10−8 )
1.00×
(0.81×; 1.23×)

1.13×1011
291
2.58 × 10−9
(2.29×10−9 ;
2.88×10−9 )
17.93×
(14.43×; 22.34×)

1.08×1011
838
7.79 × 10−9
(7.26×10−9 ;
8.32×10−9 )
1.00×
(0.87×; 1.15×)

2.83×1011
41
1.45 × 10−10
(1.00×10−10 ;
1.89×10−10 )
53.85×
(38.44×; 77.48×)

4.44×1010
1,621
3.65 × 10−8
(3.48×10−8 ;
3.83×10−8 )
1.00×
(0.91×; 1.10×)

7.84×1010
720
9.19 × 10−9
(8.52×10−9 ;
9.86×10−9 )
3.98×
(3.53×; 4.50×)
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6.5.1

Comparison of Device Cross Section
The neutron cross section for each FPGA device as a whole was also measured as part of

this experiment. Table 6.6 shows the total fluence expose and number of detected configuration
upsets for each FPGA. Both devices were found to have a similar cross section. Using the total
number of CRAM bits, the cross section of a single CRAM cell is approximated. The neutron
cross section single CRAM cell matches measurement reported reported by Xilinx [56]3 .
Table 6.6: Device Neutron Radiation Data
Device

Altera Stratix V

Xilinx Kintex 7

Total Fluence

2.89 × 1011

1.06 × 1012

Total Upsets

138,040

551,952

Device Cross Section

4.78 × 10−7

5.22 × 10−7

(95% Conf. Interval)

(4.75×10−7 ; 4.80×10−7 )

(5.20×10−7 ; 5.24×10−7 )

98,681,196

72,778,176

4.84 × 10−15

7.18 × 10−15

Total CRAM Bits
CRAM Bit Cross Section

6.6

Comparison to Fault Injection Results
Less improvement was demonstrated in the beam than in fault injection, however the re-

lationships between SEU mitigation benefits still hold. Some degradation is to be expected as
radiation can introduce more kinds of faults than fault injection can. However, test logs suggest
that perhaps SEUs were accumulating faster than the scrubbing methods could handle. SEU accumulation was not tested in fault injection.

3 As far as can be determined to date, there is no publicly available measurement of the neutron cross section
estimate for a single CRAM bit in an Altera Stratix V FPGA.

78

CHAPTER 7.

CONCLUSION

Estimating the SEU sensitivity of an FPGA design is important for many reasons. FPGA
designs may fail due to upsets in configuration memory caused by ionizing radiation. The occurrence of an SEU does not however guarantee that an FPGA design will fail. The likelihood of
an SEU causing a design to fail is different for every FPGA design. The SEU sensitivity of an
FPGA design depends on the size of the design, the target FPGA architecture, the types of SEU
mitigation techniques applied to it, etc. Knowing the SEU sensitivity of a design is very helpful
in preparing mission-critical applications for deployment, for studying SEU mitigation techniques
and improving them, and for analyzing the effects of different factors on reliability.
Several approaches have been developed to estimated the SEU sensitivity of FPGA designs
through either fault injection or radiation testing. In general, the approaches consist of running
an active design on an FPGA and comparing its outputs against a set of golden output vectors or
against the outputs of a golden design running in lockstep. Most approaches have a test fixture that
supports the active operation of the design and is able to detect functional errors. The examples
covered placed supporting test fixture logic, including functional error detection logic, outside the
scope of fault injection and radiation testing such that the test fixture and associated logic were
failure-immune. This improves the accuracy of estimation, but comes at the cost of additional
FPGAs or re-occurring engineering costs of creating custom test boards. Additional advantages
and limitations of the several approaches were discussed.
An on-chip error detection SEU sensitivity estimation approach was presented that tried to
incorporate the advantages of the other approaches into a low cost, single FPGA solution that was
easier to implement. This solution consumes additional FPGA resources by placing most of the
necessary test fixture components, including functional error detection logic and additional design
instances, on the same FPGA as the design under test. All components are subject to fault injection
and radiation testing. Implication of placing all test fixture logic within the scope of fault injection
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and radiation testing were addressed in Chapter 4. The test fixture logic was protected with SEU
mitigation techniques, and several variations of FPGA designs were loaded into the on-chip test
fixture. The driving concept behind on-chip error detection is that when an SEU causes any design
instance to fail, that failure can be detected by comparing design instances against each other or
against a set of SEU mitigated golden test vectors also placed on-chip.
Several fault injection and radiation testing experiments were conducted using an on-chip
error detection approach to estimate the SEU sensitivity of FPGA designs. Three main goals were
accomplished through theses experiments. First, the individual and combined reliability benefits
of three SEU mitigation techniques were demonstrated. Second, fault injection results obtained
from TMR protected and DWC protected on-chip functional error detection logic were compared
to determine which approach provided the most favorable results. Finally, the SEU sensitivities
of FPGA designs on two different FPGA architectures were compared to perform an cross architecture comparison of design reliability and to evaluate the benefits of SEU mitigation techniques
across architectures.
Five variations of SEU mitigation techniques were applied to the LEON3 soft processor.
Functional errors were detected using a one-to-one lockstep on-chip comparison scheme. Improvement was measured in terms of sensitivity reduction for fault injection and cross section
reduction for neutron radiation testing when compared to the baseline unmitigated design. The
results from both fault injection and radiation testing demonstrate that each variation of SEU mitigation techniques reduce the SEU sensitivity of the LEON3, and that improvement increases as
more mitigation techniques are combined. Similar results were found for the B13 design, only errors were detected using a one-to-many on-chip comparison scheme with an on-chip set of golden
test vectors. Applying TMR alone provided a 8× and 5× reduction in cross section for the LEON3
and B13 design respectively. Applying TMR with configuration scrubbing provided a 49× and a
52× reduction in cross section respectively. On-chip error detection was used to demonstrate that
combining complementary SEU mitigation techniques provides the greatest reduction in SEU sensitivity.
The functional error detection logic used to compare and reduce the outputs of multiple
design instances to a single bit that signifies whether or not a failure occurs can be protected
from SEU using TMR or DWC. TMR triplicates the comparison and reduction network and adds
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voters to mask SEUs in the functional error detection logic. DWC duplicates the comparison
and reduction network and only reports a failure when both duplicate copies detect a failure at
the same time. SEU sensitivities of several FPGA designs were estimated through fault injection
using on-chip functional error detection logic that was either protected by TMR or DWC. It was
found, for error detection, that in most cases DWC provided more favorable results with a higher
MUTF and greater improvement in reliability demonstrated between unmitigated and mitigated
FPGA designs. For this reason, DWC protected functional error detection logic was used later in
radiation testing.
Unmitigated and mitigated versions of two benchmark designs were tested for SEU sensitivity using on-chip error detection on two 28nm FPGAs with different architectures. Fault injection and radiation testing were used for comparison. Similarities were found between the two
FPGAs in the SEU sensitivity of the unmitigated version of each design and the overall device
cross section. The SEU mitigated versions of each design favored opposite FPGAs suggesting
that benefits from SEU mitigation techniques are design and FPGA architecture dependent. It was
found that these FPGAs are fairly comparable to each other for design SEU sensitivity and that
TMR and scrubbing can reduce design sensitivity to SEUs anywhere from 12× to 728× in fault
injection and 4× to 54× in radiation testings.
One drawback of the on-chip error detection experiments conducted in this thesis is that
there is no way of differentiating between a true error, a false-positive, or a false-negative. With
the information that was available, results were presented and analyzed. Future work is this field
should consider providing a way of confirming the occurrence of an error in a definitive manner.
The on-chip error detection mechanisms used in these experiments are important for future
work in fast error detection and recovery. As on-chip error detection is further researched it can be
used to improve fast error detection and recovery, which has lower overhead than TMR. All of the
detected SEUs that cause a failure to be reporter matter even if they are reporting a false-positive.
Ideally there would be no way for a single SEU to cause a false-positive error detection report.
But there are known issue in placement and routing that create these vulnerabilities [31, 32]. The
research conducted in this thesis may be helpful in identifying single point failures in on-chip error
detection mechanisms and assisting in improving their implementation.
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APPENDIX A.

DETAILS ON THE BENCHMARK DESIGNS USED

This appendix includes more detailed information on each of the designs tested. Many
versions of each design were tested that implemented various SEU mitigation techniques and error
detection mechanisms. Only a selection of the design variations are covered in this appendix

A.1

LEON3

The LEON3 is an open-source soft processor core distributed by Cobham Gaisler AB as
part of their GRLIB IP Library. It conforms to the IEEE Standard for a 32-bit Microprocessor
Architecture and Version 8 of the Scalable Processor Architecture (SPARC V8) [50]. It features a
7-stage integer pipeline with a Harvard architecture. Additional peripherals may be easily incorporated into a LEON3 system due to its bus centric system-on-chip design. As part of the GRLIB
IP Library, the LEON3 connects to additional IP cores via an on-chip bus. The GRLIB IP library
supports the AMBA-2.0 AHB/APB bus – a widely used, royalty free industry standard.
The LEON3 used in this experiment originated from the LEON3/GRLIB Release 1.4.0b4154. For this test, a minimal configuration was given to the “leon3-xilinx-kc705” design –
which targets the Xilinx Kintex-7 KC705 development board. The stripped-down configuration
of the LEON3 processor was chosen for this experiment to test the sensitivity of the core internal
architecture and to simplify the construction of the test. This simplified configuration excluded the
following default architectural components:
•
•
•
•
•

Instruction and Data Caches
Interrupt Controller
Memory Management Unit (MMU)
Debug Support Unit
External Memory Controllers

All unnecessary I/O peripherals were excluded and all instruction and data memory was
held in internal BRAM resources to avoid the need for an external memory controller. In addition,
the PLL clock controllers were removed and a 200 MHz external clock was internally divided by
four to create a 50 MHz global clock. Figure A.1 reflects the final configuration of both the LEON3
processor core and connected peripherals via the on-chip bus.
The LEON3 processor is programmed to execute the Dhrystone Version 2.1 benchmark.
Dhrystone is designed to test integer performance of a processor like that of the 7-stage integer
pipeline found in the LEON3. Executing this program assists in error detection as the processors
outputs are compared against another processor core running the same benchmark program in
lockstep. In this experiment, Dhrystone is run for 10,000 iterations in a continuous loop.
The Dhrystone output is sent across UART for external monitoring. The benchmark executes continuously to guarantee that the LEON3 processor remains active throughout the test. The
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Figure A.1: LEON3 System Architecture Under Test

caches are disabled to force the processor to communicate more frequently on the bus and facilitate
more frequent error checking.

A.2

Test Fixture

The test fixture implemented on a single FPGA for the one-to-one lockstep comparison
mechanism of the LEON3 design is shown in Figure A.2. The bus signals from the two identical
designs instances are compared in a clock-by-clock cycle fashion using a large XOR reduction
network that sets an error status register high if any bit pair disagreement is found between the two
instances. The XOR reduction network for this design is triplicated to prevent false-positive errors
(i.e. errors within the test logic that are reported as errors within the design under test).
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Figure A.2: LEON3 On-Chip Test Fixture
A.3

Resource Utilization

Table A.1 shows the average resource utilization of: the test fixture by itself, a single nonTMR LEON3 processor core, a single TMR LEON3 processor core, and a single TMR processor
core with supporting logic for BRAM scrubbing. The table also includes the overall resource
utilization of all three design versions, which includes the logic resources for the test fixture logic
and two instances of the LEON3. The percentage next to each metric is the utilization percentage
of available device resources for the Xilinx Kintex 7 XC7325T FPGA. The overhead of the SEU
mitigation technique compared to the non-TMR version is also shown. Figure A.3 shows the
placement and routing of the unmitigated, non-TMR design version compared to the mitigated,
TMR with BRAM scrubbing version.
Table A.1: LEON3 Design Variation Resource Utilization

Average Resource Utilization (Per Test Fixture or Single LEON3)
Resource
Test
Non-TMR
TMR
TMR w/BRAM
Fixture
Scrubbing
Slice
1,886 (3.70%) 1,397 (2.74%) 5,401 (10.6%) 3.87× 6,667 (13.1%) 4.77×
FF
2,726 (0.67%) 1,950 (0.48%) 5,850 (1.44%) 3.00× 6,165 (1.51%) 3.16×
LUT
3,274 (1.61%) 4,088 (2.01%) 16,041 (7.87%) 3.92× 18,094 (8.88%) 3.00×
BRAM
0 (0.00%)
50 (11.2%)
150 (33.7%) 3.00×
150 (33.7%) 3.00×
DSP
0 (0.00%)
1 (0.12%)
3 (0.36%) 3.00×
3 (0.36%) 3.00×
Total Resource Utilization (Test Fixture and Two LEON3s)
Slice
–
4,546 (8.92%) 12,746 (25.0%) 2.80× 15,294 (30.0%) 3.36×
FF
–
6,626 (1.63%) 14,426 (3.54%) 2.18× 15,056 (3.69%) 2.28×
LUT
–
11,471 (5.63%) 35,311 (17.3%) 3.08× 39,453 (19.4%) 3.44×
BRAM
–
100 (22.5%)
300 (67.4%) 3.00×
300 (67.4%) 3.00×
DSP
–
2 (0.24%)
6 (0.71%) 3.00×
6 (0.71%) 3.00×
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Unmitigated

Mitigated

Figure A.3: LEON3 Design Test Infrastructure FPGA Layout

A.4

ITC’99 B13 Benchmark Design

The B13 is a small finite state machine that interacts with a weather station. It is part of a
larger set of hardware benchmarks and has been used in other research as a reliability benchmark
for radiation testing of FPGAs [42]. Included with this benchmark design is a set of approximately
7,600 input test vectors with corresponding golden output test vectors. For experiments with this
design, these test vectors were integrated into the test fixture used to estimate SEU sensitivity.
The test vectors themselves were protected from SEUs by applying TMR and internal BRAM
scrubbing to them.

A.4.1

Test Fixture

The test fixture implemented for the B13 design is depicted in Figure A.4. This test fixture
allows multiple instances of the B13 to be tested at the same time. Since the B13 is so small,
if only one or two instances were placed within the test fixture, then the overall SEU sensitivity
would be very small. This would require long fault injection and radiation test times. To accelerate
testing, 512 instances of the B13 are instanced within the test fixture. The same test fixture setup
was used in the Xilinx and Altera designs. An XOR reduction network was used to detect errors
in both FPGAs. TMR was applied to the reduction network in the Xilinx design implementations,
and DWC was applied to the reduction network in the Altera design implementations.
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A.5

Resource Utilization

The resource utilization of a single B13 instance in a Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA is shown in
Table A.2. This table includes approximate timing penalties for applying TMR. The penalties are
significant because of how small the design is in comparison to the number of inserted feedback
synchronization voters. The resource utilization for the test infrastructure and 512 instances of
the B13 on a Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA is shown in Table A.3. Both tables compare the unmitigated
design without TMR applied to it against a TMR version of the design. The overhead of applying
TMR is shown in the “Comparison” columns of each table. Figure A.5 shows the FPGA layout
of the entire test fixture with all 512 B13 instances and compares the unmitigated and mitigated
versions.
Table A.2: Single B13 Implementation on a Xilinx Kintex-7 FPGA
Flip-flops
LUTs
Slices
Max Copies on Device
Min Clock Period
Max Clock Frequency

Unmitigated
52
36
15
3,396
1.364 ns
733.14 MHz

Mitigated
156
107
53
961
3.366 ns
297.09 MHz

Comparison
3.00×
2.97×
3.53×
0.283×
2.47×
0.405×

Table A.6 shows the resource utilization of the B13 test fixture with 512 instances of the
B13 on an Altera Stratix V FPGA. An adaptive logic module (ALM) in an Altera device is similar
to a slice in a Xilinx FPGA. A slice in a Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA consists of four 6-input look-up
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Table A.3: Implementation of 512 B13 copies on a Xilinx Kintex-7 FPGA
Flip-flops
LUTs
Slices
BRAM 36K
BRAM 18K

Unmitigated
27,025 (12.17%)
24,807 (12.17%)
8,757 (17.19%)
12 (2.70%)
6
(0.67%)

Mitigated
80,273 (19.69%)
137,350 (67.39%)
37,037 (72.69%)
12
(2.70%)
6
(0.67%)

Comparison
2.97×
5.54×
4.23×
1.0×
1.0×

Figure A.5: Xilinx B13 Design Test Infrastructure FPGA Layout: Unmitigated (Left), Mitigated
(Right).
tables, carry-chain logic, and eight flip-flops. An ALM in an Altera Stratix V FPGA consists of
an 8-input combinational logic unit, carry-chain addition logic, and 4 flip-flops. A slice represents
approximately 3× more computational resources than an ALM. Comparing the utilization metrics between Table A.3 for Xilinx and Table A.4 for Altera, approximately the same amount of
resources are used for each of the design versions between the two FPGAs. Figure A.6 shows the
resource block utilization and wire resources utilization of the unmitigated and mitigated versions
of the B13 design instances and test fixtures.
There is an interesting difference between the Xilinx and Altera implementation of internal
memory scrubbing for the test vectors used to keep the designs active and detect output errors.
Xilinx’s synthesis tool inferred true dual-port memory modules and dedicates one port to the reading and writing of memory for scrubbing, and the other port to the reading of memory for design
stimulus and output verifications. Altera’s synthesis tool inferred simple dual-port memory modules where one port is dedicated to reading and one port is dedicated to writing. Two copies of
the test vector memory modules were made. One copy’s read port was dedicated to scrubbing
logic that wrote corrected memory words back to both copies using their respective write port’s.
The other copy’s read port was dedicated to reading test vectors for use by the test fixture. Both
implementations are a valid approach.
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Table A.4: Implementation of 512 B13 copies on an Altera Stratix V FPGA
ALMs
Registers
Total Wire Utilization

Unmitigated
30,255 (12.9%)
34,559 (3.7%)
2.7%

Comparison
3.20×
2.67×
6.70×

Mitigated

Routing Utilization

Block Utilization

Unmitigated

Mitigated
96,926 (41.3%)
91,903 (9.8%)
18.1%

Figure A.6: Altera B13 Design Test Infrastructure FPGA Layout
A.6

AES 128-bit Cryptography IP Core

The AES 128-bit cryptography core is an open source core from OpenCores.org. The
implementation used in this thesis is fully pipelined. Once the pipeline is full, this implementation
produces valid data every clock cycle. The on-chip test fixture used to estimate the SEU sensitivity
of this core is designed to keep the IP core as active as possible while still monitoring for errors on
a clock-by-clock cycle basis.

A.7

Test Fixture

Figure A.7 depicts the on-chip test fixture setup for the AES cryptography core design. This
is a one-to-one comparison scheme of two chains of design instances where each chain consists
of two design instances. The purpose of chaining design instances together is so that the correct
output of one instance depends on the correct output of the other. This reduces the number of
bits that must be compared to determine if a functional error has occurred. Rather than having
to compare the outputs of each pair of design instances against each other, the output of the two
chains can be compared. This reduces the reduction network size by a factor of two. A feedback
loop is created within each chain by connecting the output of the last instance on the chain to the
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Table A.5: AES Test Fixture Resource Utilization on an Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA
Slices
LUTs
Registers

Unmitigated
13,030 (25.6%)
44,860 (22.0%)
25,787 (6.3%)

Mitigated
37,821 (74.2%)
139,124 (68.3%)
73,787 (18.1%)

Comparison
2.90×
3.10×
2.86×

input of the first instance of the chain. The test control unit fills the pipeline of the chain until the
output is valid and then it feeds the output of the chain to its input. This keeps the design active
using self generated test vectors.

Clock and
Clock and
Control

Control

AES_1a
B13_1
B13_1

AES_2a
B13_1
B13_1

AES_1b
B13_512
B13_512

AES_2b
B13_512
B13_512

Error Detection

Clock and Control
Figure A.7: AES On-Chip Test Fixture

A.8

Resource Utilization

Table A.5 shows the resource utilization of the AES test fixture with unmitigated and mitigated AES encryption core instances on a Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA. Figure A.8 displays the FPGA
layout for both design versions. The test logic in this test fixture is protected from upsets in the
error detection mechanism though the use of DWC.
Table A.6 shows the resource utilization of the AES test fixture with unmitigated and mitigated AES encryption core instances on an Altera Kintex 7 FPGA. Figure A.9 displays the FPGA
layout for both design versions; the block utilization and the routing resource utilization is displayed. The test logic in this test fixture is also protected from upsets in the error detection mechanism though the use of DWC.
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Figure A.8: Xilinx AES Design Test Infrastructure FPGA Layout:Unmitigated (Left), Mitigated
(Right).

Table A.6: AES Test Fixture Resource Utilization on an Altera Stratix V FPGA
ALMs
Registers
Total Wire Utilization

Unmitigated
64,288 (27.4%)
33,711 (3.6%)
6.4%

Comparison
2.86×
2.61×
3.03×

Mitigated

Routing Utilization

Block Utilization

Unmitigated

Mitigated
183,554 (78.2%)
87,983 (9.4%)
19.4%

Figure A.9: Altera AES Design Test Infrastructure FPGA Layout
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APPENDIX B.

FAULT INJECTION AND RADIATION TESTING LOGS

Fault injection data was collected following the approach outlined in Section 5.1 and radiation testing data was collected following the approach outlined in Section 6.1. This appendix
includes samples from the data logs collected during fault injection and radiation testing. This data
was analyzed to estimate the SEU sensitivity of each FPGA design tested.

B.1

Altera Fault Injection

The following log is from a fault injection run on the B13 non-TMR design implemented
on an Altera Stratix V FPGA using DWC protected on-chip error detection logic.
[INFO] Brigham Young University - Altera Sensitivity Testing Tool
[INFO] Command: b13NONTMR_TESTBENCH_DWC\test.py -f
[INFO] Configuration:
SOF File
- b13NONTMR_TESTBENCH_DWC\b13_test_top.sof
SMH File
- None
Inject Faults - True
Weight
- 100.0.0
Cable
- DE5 Standard [USB-1]
1479413308.52 : [INFO] Initializing Test Run...
1479413308.52 : [INFO] Programming design file b13NONTMR_TESTBENCH_DWC\b13_test_top.sof . . .
1479413334.93 : Info: *******************************************************************
1479413334.94 : Info: Running Quartus Prime Fault Injection Debugger
1479413334.94 :
Info: Version 16.0.0 Build 211 04/27/2016 SJ Standard Edition
1479413334.94 :
Info: Copyright (C) 1991-2016 Altera Corporation. All rights reserved.
1479413334.94 :
Info: Your use of Altera Corporation’s design tools, logic functions
1479413334.94 :
Info: and other software and tools, and its AMPP partner logic
1479413334.94 :
Info: functions, and any output files from any of the foregoing
1479413334.94 :
Info: (including device programming or simulation files), and any
1479413334.94 :
Info: associated documentation or information are expressly subject
1479413334.94 :
Info: to the terms and conditions of the Altera Program License
1479413334.94 :
Info: Subscription Agreement, the Altera Quartus Prime License Agreement,
1479413334.94 :
Info: the Altera MegaCore Function License Agreement, or other
1479413334.94 :
Info: applicable license agreement, including, without limitation,
1479413334.94 :
Info: that your use is for the sole purpose of programming logic
1479413334.94 :
Info: devices manufactured by Altera and sold by Altera or its
1479413334.94 :
Info: authorized distributors. Please refer to the applicable
1479413334.94 :
Info: agreement for further details.
1479413334.94 :
Info: Processing started: Thu Nov 17 13:08:28 2016
1479413334.94 : Info: Command: quartus_fid --cable="DE5 Standard [USB-1]"
--index=@1=b13NONTMR_TESTBENCH_DWC\b13_test_top.sof#pi --weight=100.0.0 -n 0
1479413334.94 : Info (208808): Using programming cable "DE5 Standard [USB-1]"
1479413334.94 : Info (209060): Started Programmer operation at Thu Nov 17 13:08:43 2016
1479413334.94 : Info (209016): Configuring device index 1
1479413334.94 : Info (209017): Device 1 contains JTAG ID code 0x029030DD
1479413334.94 : Info (209007): Configuration succeeded -- 1 device(s) configured
1479413334.94 : Info (209011): Successfully performed operation(s)
1479413334.94 : Info (209061): Ended Programmer operation at Thu Nov 17 13:08:54 2016
1479413334.94 : Info (208551): Program signature into device 1.
1479413334.94 : [INFO] Design loaded, checking jtag state...
1479413335.69 : JTAG_READ: 0b00000000000000000000000000001111
1479413335.69 : JTAG STATS - Heartbeat: 0 (True) Mismatch w/Others: False (True)
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Disagree w/Golden: False (True)
[INFO] JTAG reading properly, test is running . . .
Info (208521): Injects 1 error(s) into device(s)
Info (208540): Reading EMR array
Info (208543): No frame error detected in device 1.
Info (11623): 1 frame error(s) corrected in device 1.
Info (11620):
Corrected error #1 : Single error in frame 0x0606 at bit 0x1CF3.
JTAG_READ: 0b00000011000000110000001100001111
JTAG STATS - Heartbeat: 3 (True) Mismatch w/Others: False (True)
Disagree w/Golden: False (True)
b13NONTMR_TESTBENCH_DWC Total tests:
1 Total detected failures:
0 Duration (sec):
31
1479413339.89 : Info (208521): Injects 1 error(s) into device(s)
1479413342.53 : Info (208540): Reading EMR array
1479413342.53 : Info (208543): No frame error detected in device 1.
1479413342.53 : Info (11623): 1 frame error(s) corrected in device 1.
1479413342.53 :
Info (11620):
Corrected error #1 : Single error in frame 0x1F4A at bit 0x0A06.
1479413343.26 : JTAG_READ: 0b00000110000001100000011000001111
1479413343.26 : JTAG STATS - Heartbeat: 9 (True) Mismatch w/Others: False (True)
Disagree w/Golden: False (True)
b13NONTMR_TESTBENCH_DWC Total tests:
1 Total detected failures:
0 Duration (sec):
35
1479413335.69
1479413336.03
1479413338.69
1479413338.69
1479413338.69
1479413338.69
1479413339.40
1479413339.40

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

...
b13NONTMR_TESTBENCH_DWC Total tests:
5 Total detected failures:
4 Duration (sec):
2175
1479415484.18 : Info (208521): Injects 1 error(s) into device(s)
1479415486.83 : Info (208540): Reading EMR array
1479415486.83 : Info (208543): No frame error detected in device 1.
1479415486.95 : Info (11623): 1 frame error(s) corrected in device 1.
1479415486.95 :
Info (11620):
Corrected error #1 : Single error in frame 0x0FF8 at bit 0x00D1.
1479415487.69 : JTAG_READ: 0b00101010001010100010101000101101
1479415487.69 : JTAG STATS - Heartbeat: 295 (True) Mismatch w/Others: True (True)
Disagree w/Golden: False (True)
1479415487.69 : MISMATCH W/OTHERS FAILURE DETECTED!
1479415488.03 : Info (208540): Reading EMR array
1479415488.03 : Info (208543): No frame error detected in device 1.
b13NONTMR_TESTBENCH_DWC Total tests:
5 Total detected failures:
5 Duration (sec):
2180

B.2

Xilinx Fault Injection

The following log is from a fault injection run on the B13 non-TMR design implemented
on a Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA using TMR protected on-chip error detection logic.
[INFO] Brigham Young University - Frame Based Scrubber Sensitivity Testing Tool
[INFO] Command: ./b13_nonTMR_scrub/test.py -r
[INFO] Configuration:
Bit File
- b13_nonTMR_scrub/BF_b13_nonTMR_512x_noReset.bit
Golden File
- b13_nonTMR_scrub/BF_b13_nonTMR_512x_noReset.data
Inject Faults - False
1476805704.50 : [INFO] Performing powerCycle
1476805704.50 : [INFO] Power cycle complete
1476805704.50 : [INFO] Initializing Test Run...
1476805704.50 : [INFO] Programming design file b13_nonTMR_scrub/BF_b13_nonTMR_512x_noReset.bit . . .
Finished Full Configuration
1476805707.37 : [INFO] Design loaded, checking jtag state...
1476805707.37 : JTAG READ: 0b00000000000000000000000000000000
1476805707.38 : JTAG STATS - Fail State: 0 (True)
1476805707.38 : [INFO] JTAG reading properly, test is running . . .
Hardware Version: 7Z010 4.3
1476805707.81 : [INFO] Injected 1-bit fault at address 0x00042281, word 3, bit 15
1476805707.81 : JTAG READ: 0b00000000000000000000000000000000
1476805707.81 : JTAG STATS - Fail State: 0 (True)
b13_nonTMR_scrub Total tests:
1 Total detected failures:
0 Duration (sec):
3
1476805707.83 : [INFO] Injected 1-bit fault at address 0x00002707, word 60, bit 24
1476805707.83 : JTAG READ: 0b00000000000000000000000000000000
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1476805707.83 : JTAG STATS - Fail State: 0 (True)
b13_nonTMR_scrub Total tests:
1 Total detected failures:

0 Duration (sec):

3

...
b13_nonTMR_scrub Total tests: 117935 Total detected failures: 117930 Duration (sec): 362959
1477168663.66 : [INFO] Injected 1-bit fault at address 0x00000F20, word 22, bit 2
1477168663.66 : JTAG READ: 0b00000000000000000000000000000111
1477168663.66 : JTAG STATS - Fail State: 1 (True)
1477168663.66 : [ERROR] FAILURE DETECTED!
b13_nonTMR_scrub Total tests: 117935 Total detected failures: 117931 Duration (sec): 362959
1477168663.66 : [INFO] Initializing Test Run...
1477168663.66 : [INFO] Programming design file b13_nonTMR_scrub/BF_b13_nonTMR_512x_noReset.bit . . .
Finished Full Configuration
1477168666.08 : [INFO] Design loaded, checking jtag state...
1477168666.08 : JTAG READ: 0b00000000000000000000000000000000
1477168666.08 : JTAG STATS - Fail State: 0 (True)
1477168666.08 : [INFO] JTAG reading properly, test is running . . .
1477168666.08 : [INFO] Injected 1-bit fault at address 0x00041201, word 52, bit 4
1477168666.08 : JTAG READ: 0b00000000000000000000000000000000
1477168666.08 : JTAG STATS - Fail State: 0 (True)

B.3

Altera Neutron Radiation Testing

The following log is from a neutron radiation test beam run on the AES encryption core
TMR design implemented on an Altera Stratix V FPGA using DWC protected on-chip error detection logic. The design is programmed onto the FPGA and initialized before the beam run begins.
The beam run begins with the beam shutter opening. The beam shutter blocks the accelerated
neutron beam from the flight path (see Figure 6.1). When the design is first programmed onto
the FPGA with the shutter closed, the log shows that no upsets are detected in the configuration
memory. Once the shutter is opened, upsets in configuration memory are reported. Once a failure
is detected in the design under test, any additional configuration upsets are recorded and the FPGA
is re-programmed with the design under test to reset the design. The reset is performed so that
additional failures can be observed.
During a single beam run, multiple failures may occur and be observed. The FPGA design
is reset through a full reconfiguration between every observed failure. The beam shutter is not
closed between failures. It is closed to end a beam run. Beam runs lasted anywhere from a few
minutes to about half a day. Runs would be cut short if the experiment was malfunctioning, or the
board setup needed to be changed. Longer runs were terminated to switch the design being tested
or to analyze data. Only a single design was tested per board per beam run. It is important to
note that it is possible for the beam to be down even though the shutter is open. When this occurs
configuration upsets cease until the beam comes back up as long as the shutter is open.
Between most readings of the configuration memory status, multiple detected upsets and
corrected upsets were reported. This data suggests that the rate of upsets in configuration memory
may have been faster than the correction rate of the scrubber. This means it may be possible that
multiple upsets were allowed to accumulate between scrub cycles, which would break TMR. This
may explain why less reduction in SEU sensitivity is seen for SEU mitigation in radiation testing
than in fault injection.
[INFO] Brigham Young University - Altera Sensitivity Testing Tool
[INFO] Command: test.py
[INFO] Configuration:
SOF File
- aes_128.sof
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SMH File
- None
Inject Faults - False
Weight
- 100.0.0
Cable
- DE5 Standard [USB-1]
1481427668.94 : [INFO] Performing powerCycle
1481427679.25 : [INFO] Power cycle complete
1481427683.06 : [INFO] Initializing Test Run...
1481427683.06 : [INFO] Programming design file aes_128.sof . . .
1481427712.24 : Warning (292006): Can’t contact license server "27001@alteralic2.ee.byu.edu"
-- this server will be ignored.
1481427712.25 : Info: *******************************************************************
1481427712.25 : Info: Running Quartus Prime Fault Injection Debugger
1481427712.25 :
Info: Version 16.0.0 Build 211 04/27/2016 SJ Standard Edition
1481427712.25 :
Info: Copyright (C) 1991-2016 Altera Corporation. All rights reserved.
1481427712.25 :
Info: Your use of Altera Corporation’s design tools, logic functions
1481427712.25 :
Info: and other software and tools, and its AMPP partner logic
1481427712.25 :
Info: functions, and any output files from any of the foregoing
1481427712.25 :
Info: (including device programming or simulation files), and any
1481427712.25 :
Info: associated documentation or information are expressly subject
1481427712.25 :
Info: to the terms and conditions of the Altera Program License
1481427712.25 :
Info: Subscription Agreement, the Altera Quartus Prime License Agreement,
1481427712.25 :
Info: the Altera MegaCore Function License Agreement, or other
1481427712.25 :
Info: applicable license agreement, including, without limitation,
1481427712.25 :
Info: that your use is for the sole purpose of programming logic
1481427712.25 :
Info: devices manufactured by Altera and sold by Altera or its
1481427712.25 :
Info: authorized distributors. Please refer to the applicable
1481427712.25 :
Info: agreement for further details.
1481427712.25 :
Info: Processing started: Sat Dec 10 20:41:23 2016
1481427712.25 : Info: Command: quartus_fid --cable="DE5 Standard [USB-1]"
--index=@1=aes_128.sof#pi --weight=100.0.0 -n 0
1481427712.25 : Info (208808): Using programming cable "DE5 Standard [USB-1]"
1481427712.25 : Info (209060): Started Programmer operation at Sat Dec 10 20:41:39 2016
1481427712.25 : Info (209016): Configuring device index 1
1481427712.25 : Info (209017): Device 1 contains JTAG ID code 0x029030DD
1481427712.25 : Info (209007): Configuration succeeded -- 1 device(s) configured
1481427712.25 : Info (209011): Successfully performed operation(s)
1481427712.25 : Info (209061): Ended Programmer operation at Sat Dec 10 20:41:50 2016
1481427712.25 : Info (208551): Program signature into device 1.
1481427712.25 : [INFO] Design loaded, checking jtag state...
1481427713.31 : JTAG_READ: 0b00000111000001110000011100001111
1481427713.31 : JTAG STATS - Heartbeat: 7 (True) Mismatch w/Others: False (True)
Disagree w/Golden: False (True)
1481427713.34 : [INFO] JTAG reading properly, test is running . . .
1481427714.76 : Info (208540): Reading EMR array
1481427714.76 : Info (208543): No frame error detected in device 1.
1481427716.08 : JTAG_READ: 0b00001111000011110000111100001111
1481427716.08 : JTAG STATS - Heartbeat: 15 (True) Mismatch w/Others: False (True)
Disagree w/Golden: False (True)
...
1481455465.72 : JTAG STATS - Heartbeat: 117 (True) Mismatch w/Others:
Disagree w/Golden: False (True)
1481455469.40 : Info (208540): Reading EMR array
1481455469.40 : Info (208544): 3 frame error(s) detected in device 1.
1481455469.52 : [INFO] Error needing scrub detected.
1481455469.52 :
Info (208545):
Error #1 (0x0174F92171) : Single
1481455469.52 : [INFO] Error needing scrub detected.
1481455469.52 :
Info (208545):
Error #2 (0x0067986941) : Single
1481455469.52 : [INFO] Error needing scrub detected.
1481455469.52 :
Info (208545):
Error #3 (0x00B49207E1) : Single
1481455469.52 : Info (11623): 4 frame error(s) corrected in device 1.
1481455469.52 : [INFO] Error needing scrub NOT FOUND!
1481455469.52 :
Info (11620):
Corrected error #1 : Single error
1481455469.52 : [INFO] Error needing scrub NOT FOUND!
1481455469.52 :
Info (11620):
Corrected error #2 : Single error
1481455469.52 : [INFO] Error needing scrub NOT FOUND!
1481455469.52 :
Info (11620):
Corrected error #3 : Single error
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False (True)

error in frame 0x2E9F at bit 0x1217.
error in frame 0x0CF3 at bit 0x0694.
error in frame 0x1692 at bit 0x207E.

in frame 0x2D84 at bit 0x0312.
in frame 0x0F8F at bit 0x26FC.
in frame 0x13B9 at bit 0x0C48.

1481455469.52
1481455469.52
1481455473.46
1481455474.61
1481455474.61

:
:
:
:
:

[INFO] Error needing scrub NOT FOUND!
Info (11620):
Corrected error #4 : Single error in frame 0x13BA at bit 0x0C48.
Info (208525): External scrubbing
JTAG_READ: 0b10010000100100001001000000001111
JTAG STATS - Heartbeat: 144 (True) Mismatch w/Others: False (True)
Disagree w/Golden: False (True)

...
1481455483.09 : JTAG STATS - Heartbeat: 169 (True) Mismatch w/Others: False (True)
Disagree w/Golden: False (True)
1481455486.86 : Info (208540): Reading EMR array
1481455486.86 : Info (208544): 4 frame error(s) detected in device 1.
1481455486.86 : [INFO] Error needing scrub detected.
1481455486.86 :
Info (208545):
Error #1 (0x00ED580D81) : Single error in frame 0x1DAB at bit 0x00D8.
1481455486.86 : [INFO] Error needing scrub detected.
1481455486.86 :
Info (208545):
Error #2 (0x00ED600D81) : Single error in frame 0x1DAC at bit 0x00D8.
1481455486.86 : [INFO] Error needing scrub detected.
1481455486.86 :
Info (208545):
Error #3 (0x01054173D1) : Single error in frame 0x20A8 at bit 0x173D.
1481455486.86 : [INFO] Error needing scrub detected.
1481455486.86 :
Info (208545):
Error #4 (0x007D097301) : Single error in frame 0x0FA1 at bit 0x1730.
1481455491.01 : Info (208525): External scrubbing
1481455492.26 : JTAG_READ: 0b11000100110001001100010000101101
1481455492.26 : JTAG STATS - Heartbeat: 196 (True) Mismatch w/Others: True (True)
Disagree w/Golden: False (True)
1481455492.26 : MISMATCH W/OTHERS FAILURE DETECTED!
1481455496.03 : Info (208540): Reading EMR array
1481455496.03 : Info (208544): 3 frame error(s) detected in device 1.
1481455496.06 : [INFO] Error needing scrub detected.
1481455496.06 :
Info (10914):
Error #1 (0x00F06001FF) : Uncorrectable multi-bit error in frame 0x1E0C.
1481455496.06 : [INFO] Error needing scrub detected.
1481455496.06 :
Info (208545):
Error #2 (0x00AD325871) : Single error in frame 0x15A6 at bit 0x2587.
1481455496.06 : [INFO] Error needing scrub detected.
1481455496.06 :
Info (208545):
Error #3 (0x00CA4196D1) : Single error in frame 0x1948 at bit 0x196D.
1481455496.06 : Info (11623): 3 frame error(s) corrected in device 1.
1481455496.06 : [INFO] Error needing scrub NOT FOUND!
1481455496.06 :
Info (11620):
Corrected error #1 : Single error in frame 0x1151 at bit 0x26D0.
1481455496.06 : [INFO] Error needing scrub NOT FOUND!
1481455496.06 :
Info (11620):
Corrected error #2 : Single error in frame 0x1AF3 at bit 0x0C34.
1481455496.06 : [INFO] Error needing scrub NOT FOUND!
1481455496.06 :
Info (11620):
Corrected error #3 : Single error in frame 0x1C7B at bit 0x1C58.
1481455496.06 : [INFO] Initializing Test Run...
1481455496.06 : [INFO] Programming design file aes_128.sof . . .
1481455524.73 : Warning (292006): Can’t contact license server "27001@alteralic2.ee.byu.edu"
-- this server will be ignored.
1481455524.73 : Info: *******************************************************************
1481455524.73 : Info: Running Quartus Prime Fault Injection Debugger
1481455524.73 :
Info: Version 16.0.0 Build 211 04/27/2016 SJ Standard Edition
1481455524.73 :
Info: Copyright (C) 1991-2016 Altera Corporation. All rights reserved.
1481455524.73 :
Info: Your use of Altera Corporation’s design tools, logic functions
1481455524.73 :
Info: and other software and tools, and its AMPP partner logic
1481455524.73 :
Info: functions, and any output files from any of the foregoing
1481455524.73 :
Info: (including device programming or simulation files), and any
1481455524.73 :
Info: associated documentation or information are expressly subject
1481455524.73 :
Info: to the terms and conditions of the Altera Program License
1481455524.73 :
Info: Subscription Agreement, the Altera Quartus Prime License Agreement,
1481455524.73 :
Info: the Altera MegaCore Function License Agreement, or other
1481455524.73 :
Info: applicable license agreement, including, without limitation,
1481455524.73 :
Info: that your use is for the sole purpose of programming logic
1481455524.73 :
Info: devices manufactured by Altera and sold by Altera or its
1481455524.73 :
Info: authorized distributors. Please refer to the applicable
1481455524.73 :
Info: agreement for further details.
1481455524.73 :
Info: Processing started: Sun Dec 11 04:24:56 2016
1481455524.73 : Info: Command: quartus_fid --cable="DE5 Standard [USB-1]"
--index=@1=aes_128.sof#pi --weight=100.0.0 -n 0
1481455524.73 : Info (208808): Using programming cable "DE5 Standard [USB-1]"
1481455524.73 : Info (209060): Started Programmer operation at Sun Dec 11 04:25:11 2016
1481455524.73 : Info (209016): Configuring device index 1
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1481455524.73
1481455524.73
1481455524.73
1481455524.73
1481455524.73
1481455524.73
1481455525.99
1481455525.99

Info (209017): Device 1 contains JTAG ID code 0x029030DD
Info (209007): Configuration succeeded -- 1 device(s) configured
Info (209011): Successfully performed operation(s)
Info (209061): Ended Programmer operation at Sun Dec 11 04:25:23 2016
Info (208551): Program signature into device 1.
[INFO] Design loaded, checking jtag state...
JTAG_READ: 0b00000111000001110000011100001111
JTAG STATS - Heartbeat: 7 (True) Mismatch w/Others: False (True)
Disagree w/Golden: False (True)
1481455525.99 : [INFO] JTAG reading properly, test is running . . .

B.4

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Xilinx Neutron Radiation Testing

The following log is from a neutron radiation test beam run on the B13 TMR design implemented on an Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA using TMR protected error detection logic. Note that
multiple design failures are observed within a single beam run with a full reconfiguration in between observed failures. Again, multiple configuration upsets are detected and repaired within a
single scrub cycle. This indicated that SEU accumulation has occurred, or that a single energetic
ionizing particle has upset more than a single bit. SEU accumulation can break redundancy protection. This could explain why less reduction in SEU sensitivity is seen for SEU mitigation in
radiation testing than in fault injection.
[INFO] Brigham Young University - Frame Based Scrubber Sensitivity Testing Tool
[INFO] Command: test.py
[INFO] Configuration:
Bit File
- BF_b13_TMR_512x_noReset.bit
Golden File
- BF_b13_TMR_512x_noReset.data
Inject Faults - False
1476053797.99 : [INFO] Performing powerCycle
1476053810.40 : [INFO] Power cycle complete
1476053810.41 : [INFO] Initializing Test Run...
1476053810.41 : [INFO] Programming design file BF_b13_TMR_512x_noReset.bit . . .
Finished Full Configuration
1476053813.00 : [INFO] Design loaded, checking jtag state...
1476053813.00 : JTAG READ: 0b00000000000000000000000000000000
1476053813.00 : JTAG STATS - Fail State: 0 (True)
1476053813.00 : [INFO] JTAG reading properly, test is running . . .
Hardware Version: 7Z010 4.3
1476053813.06 : [INFO] Beginning scrub cycle number 1 ...
1476053815.54 : Readback Finished
1476053815.58 : [INFO] Finshed scrub cycle 1, Upsets: 0, Time Elapsed: 2.52
1476053815.58 : JTAG READ: 0b00000000000000000000000000000000
1476053815.58 : JTAG STATS - Fail State: 0 (True)
b13_TMR_scrub Total tests:
1 Total detected failures:
0 Duration (sec):
1476053815.59 : [INFO] Beginning scrub cycle number 2 ...
1476053818.07 : Readback Finished
1476053818.11 : [INFO] Finshed scrub cycle 2, Upsets: 0, Time Elapsed: 2.52
1476053818.11 : JTAG READ: 0b00000000000000000000000000000000
1476053818.11 : JTAG STATS - Fail State: 0 (True)
b13_TMR_scrub Total tests:
1 Total detected failures:
0 Duration (sec):
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1476075586.67
1476075586.67
b13_TMR_scrub
1476075586.68
1476075589.16
1476075589.20
1476075589.21
1476075589.21

: JTAG READ: 0b00000000000000000000000000000000
: JTAG STATS - Fail State: 0 (True)
Total tests:
8 Total detected failures:
6 Duration (sec): 21441
: [INFO] Beginning scrub cycle number 8446 ...
: Readback Finished
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00022B82, Word: 85, Bit(s): 0x08000000 (1)
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00022B83, Word: 85, Bit(s): 0x04000000 (1)
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00400019, Word: 55, Bit(s): 0x00001000 (1)
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1476075589.22
1476075589.22
1476075589.23
1476075589.23
1476075589.23
1476075589.23
1476075589.23
b13_TMR_scrub

: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00402892, Word: 55, Bit(s): 0x00200000
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00402894, Word: 55, Bit(s): 0x00600000
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00402895, Word: 55, Bit(s): 0x00200000
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00440612, Word: 62, Bit(s): 0x00000001
: [INFO] Finshed scrub cycle 8446, Upsets: 8, Time Elapsed: 2.55
: JTAG READ: 0b00000000000000000000000000000000
: JTAG STATS - Fail State: 0 (True)
Total tests:
8 Total detected failures:
6 Duration (sec): 21443
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...
b13_TMR_scrub
1476089210.35
1476089212.83
1476089212.87
1476089212.88
1476089212.88
1476089212.89
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b13_TMR_scrub
1476089212.89
1476089215.37
1476089215.42
1476089215.42
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1476089215.42
1476089217.90
1476089217.95
1476089217.95
1476089217.96
1476089217.96
1476089217.96
1476089217.97

Total tests:
14 Total detected failures:
12 Duration (sec): 35064
: [INFO] Beginning scrub cycle number 13813 ...
: Readback Finished
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00021C23, Word: 36, Bit(s): 0x00000100
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x0002260C, Word: 71, Bit(s): 0x00000010
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00401B0A, Word: 84, Bit(s): 0x00100000
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00401B0B, Word: 84, Bit(s): 0x00200000
: [INFO] Finshed scrub cycle 13813, Upsets: 4, Time Elapsed: 2.54
: JTAG READ: 0b00000000000000000000000000000000
: JTAG STATS - Fail State: 0 (True)
Total tests:
14 Total detected failures:
12 Duration (sec): 35067
: [INFO] Beginning scrub cycle number 13814 ...
: Readback Finished
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00020822, Word: 67, Bit(s): 0x01000000
: [INFO] Finshed scrub cycle 13814, Upsets: 1, Time Elapsed: 2.53
: JTAG READ: 0b00000000000000000000000000000111
: JTAG STATS - Fail State: 1 (True)
: [ERROR] FAILURE DETECTED!
: [INFO] Beginning scrub cycle number 13815 ...
: Readback Finished
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00000505, Word: 59, Bit(s): 0x00000010
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00040D0D, Word: 53, Bit(s): 0x00000040
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00040D0E, Word: 53, Bit(s): 0x00000100
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00040D0F, Word: 53, Bit(s): 0x00000080
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00401CA1, Word: 46, Bit(s): 0x00000020
: [INFO] Finshed scrub cycle 13815, Upsets: 5, Time Elapsed: 2.55

b13_TMR_scrub
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Finished Full
1476089220.57
1476089220.57
1476089220.57
1476089220.57
1476089220.57
1476089223.05
1476089223.09
1476089223.10
1476089223.10
1476089223.11
1476089223.11
1476089223.12
1476089223.12
1476089223.12
1476089223.12
b13_TMR_scrub
1476089223.12
1476089225.60
1476089225.64
1476089225.65
1476089225.65
1476089225.65
1476089225.65
b13_TMR_scrub

Total tests:
14 Total detected failures:
13 Duration (sec): 35072
: [INFO] Initializing Test Run...
: [INFO] Programming design file BF_b13_TMR_512x_noReset.bit . . .
Configuration
: [INFO] Design loaded, checking jtag state...
: JTAG READ: 0b00000000000000000000000000000000
: JTAG STATS - Fail State: 0 (True)
: [INFO] JTAG reading properly, test is running . . .
: [INFO] Beginning scrub cycle number 13816 ...
: Readback Finished
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00020B90, Word: 74, Bit(s): 0x00000080 (1)
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00020B91, Word: 74, Bit(s): 0x00000040 (1)
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00402498, Word: 70, Bit(s): 0x00003000 (2)
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00402499, Word: 70, Bit(s): 0x00003000 (2)
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00420A94, Word: 69, Bit(s): 0x00010000 (1)
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00420EA2, Word: 48, Bit(s): 0x00000100 (1)
: [INFO] Finshed scrub cycle 13816, Upsets: 8, Time Elapsed: 2.55
: JTAG READ: 0b00000000000000000000000000000000
: JTAG STATS - Fail State: 0 (True)
Total tests:
15 Total detected failures:
13 Duration (sec): 35077
: [INFO] Beginning scrub cycle number 13817 ...
: Readback Finished
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00001120, Word: 10, Bit(s): 0x00000002 (1)
: [INFO] Upset(s) Detected, Frame: 0x00021A89, Word: 100, Bit(s): 0x00200000 (1)
: [INFO] Finshed scrub cycle 13817, Upsets: 2, Time Elapsed: 2.53
: JTAG READ: 0b00000000000000000000000000000000
: JTAG STATS - Fail State: 0 (True)
Total tests:
15 Total detected failures:
13 Duration (sec): 35080
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